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CRITICAL PROCEDURE: ADR
AND THE JUSTICES’ “SECOND WAVE”
CONSTRICTION OF COURT ACCESS
AND CLAIM DEVELOPMENT
Eric K. Yamamoto*

ABSTRACT
Expansive alternative dispute resolution (ADR) was the centerpiece of
efficiency-based procedural reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s. ADR
and other reforms collectively altered the litigation landscape, at times for
the better. Yet some scholars raised early questions about ADR’s effect on
systemic litigation fairness and the ability of the disenfranchised to assert
and maintain claims in court. Amid second wave procedural changes, commencing around the mid-2000s, a Justice Scalia-led majority significantly
expanded the grasp of compelled, private, and individualized arbitration.
Under the shroud of efficiency, that Court majority imposed those second
wave changes by judicial fiat, bypassing formal rulemaking. Collectively,
both waves sharply constrict court access and claim development to the
detriment of less powerful social groups. Two Supreme Court cases—
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant (Amex) and AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (Concepcion)—epitomize ADR’s privatization (without judges, full discovery, or public scrutiny) and individuation
(without class adjudication, broad joinder, or cost sharing) of claims by
employees, consumers, tenants, small businesses, and discrimination claimants against more powerful businesses and institutions. This Article first
articulates a developing Critical Procedure analytical framework for assessing the political and ideological preferences in and intended substantive
consequences of procedure’s formation, application, and revision. It then
assesses Amex and Concepcion through this critical procedure lens and
concludes that these ostensibly efficiency-driven ADR rulings are actually a
claim suppressing mechanism that effectively shields large businesses from
substantive law liability and public accountability, creating “an alternate
system of justice” for those businesses that casts doubt about the legitimacy
of the legal system.

* The Fred T. Korematsu Professor of Law and Social Justice, William S. Richardson
School of Law, University of Hawai‘i. My thanks to Alyssa Simbahon, Chase Suzumoto,
Laurel Pepe, Lane Kaiwi Opulauoho, Rachel Oyama, and Arielle Kramer for their valuable contributions.
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“The erection of barriers to court access under the guise of procedural
efficiency . . . will burden the weak and the aggrieved unfairly, and it
ultimately will undermine the legitimacy of the legal system.”
—Jack Weinstein, U.S. District Judge1
“Over the last 10 years, thousands of businesses across the country . . .
have used arbitration to create an alternate system of justice.”
—Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Michael Corkery, New York Times2
“This is among the most profound shifts in our legal
history. . . .Ominously, business has a good chance of opting out of the
legal system altogether and misbehaving without reproach.”
—William G. Young, U.S. District Judge3
I. INTRODUCTION

T

WENTY years ago, in an essay ADR: Where Have the Critics
Gone?,4 I described a hastening rush toward alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) paired with a notable decline in mainstream
scholarship critical of key aspects of ADR.5 I observed then that the
ADR train had left the station and that critics of its impacts on societal
“outsiders”6 were not welcome aboard.7
1. Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the
Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1906 (1989).
2. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a “Privatization of the
Justice System”, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/
dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html?_r=2 [Perma link
unavailable].
3. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), http//www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business
dealbook, arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of justice.html?_r=1 (quoting Judge
William G. Young).
4. Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR: Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1055 (1996) [hereinafter Yamamoto, ADR].
5. See id. at 1055–56.
6. The 1996 ADR essay characterized “outsiders” as “racial minorities, women and
the poor; those traditionally of lesser power in society.” Id. at 1058. It also cited Mari
Matsuda’s description of “outsider” as constituencies historically excluded from jurisprudential discourse. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2323 n.15 (1989). This present Critical Procedure article
builds upon these characterizations of outsiders to also encompass “those outside the political and cultural mainstream, particularly those challenging accepted legal principles and
social norms” and those who “rais[e] difficult and often tenuous claims that demand the
reordering of established political, economic and social arrangements, that is, those at the
system’s and society’s margins.” Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of
Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 345 (1990) [hereinafter
Yamamoto, Efficieny’s Threat] (footnote omitted).
7. Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 4, at 1066–67 (“We need to ask if amid mainstream
ADR proselytizing by Congress, courts, scholars and practitioners a master narrative has
emerged that the ADR ‘train has already left the station’ and that all who do not scramble
aboard will be left behind.” (footnote omitted)).
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Writing during a “First Wave” of efficiency procedural reforms in the
1980s through mid-1990s,8 and drawing upon the insights of pioneering
scholars,9 I asked whether this “ADR Express” undermined legal discourse and policy decisions critical of ADR’s overall efficacy.10 ADR’s
overpowering salutary narrative, it appeared, tended especially to exclude, or at least overlook, those critical of ADR’s harmful effects on
marginalized social groups.11
I cast these perceptions in preliminary fashion. Many have since materialized into procedural reality. This reality, as others and I now suggest,
is integral to larger “Second Wave” procedural changes that commenced
around the mid-2000s12 and continue today. A spate of restrictive Supreme Court rulings sharply constricts court access and claim development, so much so that some characterize it as a deformation of
procedure13 reflecting a sharply “restrictive ethos.”14
During the ongoing Second Wave, a monumental ADR decision,
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant15 (AMEX), dramatically, and perhaps traumatically for some, altered the justice landscape.16
AMEX, along with its predecessor AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion17
(Concepcion), through tight enforcement of small-print arbitration
clauses in a wide array of contracts under the Federal Arbitration Act,18
compels private arbitration of nearly all small-claimant-versus-large-business disputes and, moreover, compels those claimants’ waiver of class
8. Framed generally, the First Wave of reforms spanned from the late 1970s through
the early 1990s. For a succinct description of the impetus for the First Wave efficiency
reforms, see generally, Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6.
9. See Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 4, at 1058–62 (outlining early critiques of ADR
by Owen Fiss, Richard Delgado, Marjorie Silver, Trina Grillo, John Esser, Carrie MenkelMeadow, and Kim Dayton).
10. With this in mind, I posed the following questions:
If there has been a decline in the amount, depth, and prominence of scholarship critical of ADR, . . . why is this so? Is it because studies reveal the
across-the-board salutary effects of ADR? . . . Or is a decline linked to a
“failing faith” in adjudication and our collective pressing need to embrace an
encompassing alternative? Or is there scholarly, or prominent law review,
disinterest in the issues? Or is it because ADR issues of race, gender and
class arise only in the limited context of family disputes and civil rights
claims, and ADR is now most prevalent in contract and tort disputes? Or
something else?
Id. at 1066 (footnote omitted).
11. See id. at 1066–67.
12. For a discussion of an “Interregnum” period between the First and Second Waves,
see infra Section II.B.
13. See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on
the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286,
357–71 (2013).
14. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 353, 358–59 (2010) (footnote omitted) (broadly characterizing philosophical ethos of
the recent procedural changes as “restrictive” of court access and the pursuit of claims).
15. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
16. See infra Section V.
17. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
18. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–16 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No.
115-46).
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adjudication.19
These cases epitomize ADR’s privatization (without judges, full discovery, or public scrutiny) and individuation (without broad joinder or cost
sharing) of claims by employees, consumers, tenants, small businesses,
and discrimination claimants against more powerful businesses and institutions.20 The consequences are in-your-face startling. Backed by other
cases, AMEX and Concepcion effectively block fair resolution of a wide
range of potentially meritorious claims possessed by those of lesser societal stature or economic power. In doing so, they erect for many an insurmountable threshold barrier to justice.21 Moreover, the combined
procedural rulings undercut major businesses’ and institutions’ substantive legal liability and diminish their public accountability—undermining
the rule of law.22
These practical consequences result not from fully vetted, formal procedural rulemaking. Rather, they emerge from the singular votes of a slim
conservative majority of the Supreme Court—significant procedural
change by judicial fiat. And now, despite considerable push back by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), lower courts, and workers’ advocates, the reconstituted conservative-leaning Court appears poised to
affirm unbargained-for arbitration class action waivers despite union employees’ right to bargain collectively.23 Moreover, in late 2017, Congress
and President Trump blocked the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau’s effort to invalidate those waivers in consumer financial transactions.24 Indeed, in crucial ways, expanding compelled privatized, individu19. See infra Section V.
20. See id.
21. See infra Section VI.
22. See Weinstein, supra note 1.
23. See NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017). The Court granted
certiorari to resolve conflicts between the Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits (finding
mandatory class waivers do not violate employees’ National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
right to engage in concerted activity) and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits (ruling that compelled waivers violate unionized employees rights under the NLRA § 8(a)(1)). See also In
re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184 (2012) (holding that compelled judicial class
action waiver violates employee’s right under the NLRA § 8(a)(1) to engage in concerted
activity, but later reversed in part by D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir.
2013) (holding that NLRB’s decision did not give proper weight to FAA and that the arbitration agreement was enforceable)); Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.
2016) (affirming lower court’s determination that arbitration clause waiving collective actions was unenforceable under the NLRA); Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975
(9th Cir. 2016) (reversing judgment of the lower court and finding arbitration clause waiving class actions violates NLRA and concerted class action waiver was unenforceable
under the FAA); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013) (reversing
the lower court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion to dismiss or stay arbitration proceedings and instead holding that employees’ right to class action can be waived in an
arbitration agreement); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013) (reversing
the district court’s decision and instead concluding that the class waiver at issue was enforceable) In granting certiorari in NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., the Court consolidated
appeals from the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Court decisions discussed above.
24. H.R.J. Res. 111, 115th Cong., 131 Stat. 1243 (2017) (congressional resolution invalidating the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s rule prohibiting mandatory arbitration
class waivers for consumer financial transactions (Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg.
33,210 (July 19, 2017))); Gail Ablow, Trump Kills CFPB Arbitration Rule: The Little Guy
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alized arbitration reflects the “most profound shift in our legal history.”25
For this reason, and others discussed below, alternative dispute resolution, through AMEX and Concepcion, now takes center stage in a conservative majority generated deformation of procedure26 that, in Judge
Weinstein’s words, “under the guise of procedural efficiency . . . burden[s]
the weak and the aggrieved unfairly, and . . . ultimately will undermine
the legitimacy of the legal system.”27 In this Second Wave setting, the
time is ripe through critical procedure inquiry to assess AMEX and Concepcion and the contemporary relevance of ADR: Where Have the Critics
Gone?.
II. CONSTRICTING COURT ACCESS AND CLAIM
DEVELOPMENT: TWO WAVES OF
PROCEDURAL CHANGE
Let’s begin with a big picture. Framing kinetic movement in the legal
process while leaving details in the distance for later examination. The
picture’s outlines and coloring convey messages that are legally significant—and socially disturbing.
The drafters designed the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP)28 to ensure court access and foster decisions on the merits.29 Few
would “disagree that the Federal Rules were intended by their drafters to
open wide the courthouse doors”30—described as the FRCP’s “liberal
ethos.”31 This “open-access approach,” however, “was not always a welcome development in the eyes of all.”32 With low pleading barriers, farLoses Again, MOYERS & COMPANY (Nov. 02, 2017), http://billmoyers.com/story/trumpkills-cfpb-arbitration-rule-little-guy-loses/ (reporting on President Trump’s approval of the
congressional resolution).
25. See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 3.
26. See Miller, supra note 13, at 357.
27. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 1906.
28. The Enabling Act of 1934 authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate civil procedural rules that govern federal courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). Rulemakers with congressional approval promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. STEPHEN N.
SUBRIN & MARGARET Y.K. WOO, LITIGATING IN AMERICA: CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 54 (2006).
29. See Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2–3, 25 (1988) [hereinafter Weinstein, Ghost] (“[T]he Rules provided an immense shift towards increasing plaintiffs’ capacity to enforce substantive rights.”); see also Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of
Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439
(1986) (“Sobered by the fate of the Field Code, Dean Clark and the other drafters of the
Federal Rules set out to devise a procedural system that would install what may be labeled
the ‘liberal ethos,’ in which the preferred disposition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full
disclosure through discovery.”).
30. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 1906 (describing the drafters’ commitment to ensuring
access to justice).
31. “The liberal ethos in civil procedure generally refers to those aspects of federal
procedure that tend to promote access and merits-based or accurate resolutions of civil
disputes.” Spencer, supra note 14, at 354 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 359 (citing Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25
REV. LITIG. 79, 85 (2006); Claim or Cause of Action: A Discussion on the Need for Amendment of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 F.R.D. 253, 255–56 (1952)).
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reaching discovery, and the new 1966 class action device,33 the 1960s and
1970s witnessed the rise of public law litigation34—more complicated
cases implicating new federal and state law claims of public interest, including civil rights, employment and housing discrimination, environmental protection, products liability, and financial regulation.35 Those
concerned about systemic inefficiencies of expanding litigation opportunities teamed up with those desirous of limiting corporate liability and
accountability under substantive law to push for a procedural narrowing
of the adjudication system.36
Thirty years of legal and political skirmishing generated two waves of
procedural changes. These waves sometimes bolstered the liberal ethos,37
but most often undercut it.38And they marked significant shifts in the
shape and tenor of federal litigation and the people and institutions affected by it.
A. THE FIRST WAVE: EFFICIENCY REFORMS
Beginning in the late 1970s, “[c]ries for procedural reform emanated
from many camps . . . . The rallying point—efficiency.”39 The expansion
of public law litigation posed new challenges,40 including discrimination
claims against government and private employers, charges of excesses
against administrative regulatory regimes, deceptive practices by large retailers, product defect claims against mass manufacturers, and environmental claims against manufacturers and agribusinesses.41 The flurry of
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
34. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976) (describing how public law litigation differs significantly from the traditional model).
35. See Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 270, 279–83 (1989) (describing the differences between private litigation
and public law litigation, including the latter’s “‘sprawling and amorphous’ party structure” and the widespread effects of the outcome on many person and entities, sometimes
not directly involved in the lawsuit).
36. See David Halperin, Discovery Abuse: How Defendants in Products Liability Lawsuits Hide and Destroy Evidence, PUBLIC CITIZEN (July 1997), https://www.citizen.org/article/discovery-abuse-how-defendants-products-liability-lawsuits-hide-and-destroy-evidence
[https://perma.cc/J24J-3STP] (describing business associations’ push for “tort reform” that
resulted in ostensibly efficiency-neutral procedural changes benefitting businesses).
37. See Spencer, supra note 14, at 353 (referencing the previously established understanding of the 1938 FRCP to “promote open access to the courts and to facilitate a resolution of disputes on the merits”).
38. See id. at 353–54 (“[A] ‘restrictive ethos’ prevails in procedure today, with many
rules being developed, interpreted, and applied in a manner that frustrates the ability of
claimants to prosecute their claims and receive a decision on the merits.”).
39. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 350.
40. See Tobias, supra note 35, at 270–71 (discussing originally unforeseen impacts of
public law litigation); Chayes, supra note 34, at 1284 (coining the term and describing the
attributes of “public law litigation”).
41. See Weinstein, Ghost, supra note 29, at 2–3, 25 (“[T]he Rules provided an immense
shift towards increasing plaintiffs’ capacity to enforce substantive rights.”); see also Marcus,
supra note 29, at 439 (“Sobered by the fate of the Field Code, Dean Clark and the other
drafters of the Federal Rules set out to devise a procedural system that would install what
may be labeled the ‘liberal ethos,’ in which the preferred disposition is on the merits, by
jury trial, after full disclosure through discovery.”).
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new substantive law claims, generated by both legislatures and courts, in
conjunction with the open-door spirit of the Federal Rules regime42 and
the newly codified class action rule,43 expanded litigation in federal
courts. That expansion meant more case filings, more sprawling party
structures, sometimes intense discovery battles, and occasional judge-supervised equitable relief.44 This volatile mix combusted into what some
described as a “litigation explosion.”45 The catchphrases—too much cost,
too much delay, too many unmeritorious claims—spurred growing numbers of reform advocates. Their focus: litigation procedures.
But the super-heated rhetoric about an ostensible litigation explosion
wreaking havoc on the justice system often belied realities. Increased
court filings of substantive legal claims roughly paralleled population
growth, and excessive cost and delay did not mark the vast majority of
“ordinary” cases.46 The 1938 Federal Rules regime, with open access, liberal discovery, and minimal judge management, continued to work well
in many small-to-moderate-value suits.
It also tended, however, to encourage over-discovery in some cases and
to allow parties—mostly large, well-resourced defendants but also some
plaintiffs lawyers’ personal injury groups47—to game the system in more
complicated cases. In those cases litigation became a game of financial
intimidation and attrition—dispute resolution driven in part by which
42. According to U.S. District Judge Jack Weinstein, a highly regarded procedure specialist, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ensured open public access to the courts by
simplifying procedures—lowering the threshold for pleading requirements, concentrating
litigation in one forum, and liberally structuring discovery to avoid surprise. Weinstein,
Ghost, supra note 29, at 2–3. Judge Weinstein acknowledged other factors in the opening of
the federal courts:
[A] powerful civil rights movement, the expansion of the contingency fee, a
huge growth in the power of the bar, and a genuine sense of devotion by
most members of the legal profession to the principle that all Americans
have the right to vindication of what the substantive law in theory affords.
Id. at 3. Another factor to add to this list is the congressional creation of “rights” enforceable by individuals in federal court and the emergence of public interest law groups.
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (promulgated in current form in 1966).
44. See, e.g., Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV.
3, 4 (1986) (evaluating the apparent increase in civil litigation); Halperin, supra note 36
(describing discovery battles and judge supervised equitable relief).
45. Galanter, supra note 44, at 5–7 (finding a lack of reliable empirical evidence to
document the “litigation explosion”).
46. Id. at 3; see Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 351 n.45.
47. Organized segments of the plaintiffs personal injury bar have been criticized for
improperly soliciting claimants, pursuing dubious claims, and caring more about attorney’s
fees than helping injured clients. See Deborah R. Hensler et al., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS:
PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 49, 79–81, 102 (2000) (describing financial
incentives for organized plaintiffs bars to litigate class actions and the apparent negative
impacts on defendants’ businesses); see also Donald W. Nauss, Chrysler Takes on “Frivolous” Suits with Legal Action Against 5 Lawyers, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Mar. 27, 1996),
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-03-27/business/fi-51800_1_class-action-lawsuits [https://per
ma.cc/G9P9-8NLR] (reporting on Chrysler Motor Company’s suit against lawyers who “allegedly acted improperly in filing . . . frivolous class-action lawsuits” because class actions
“have become increasingly troublesome to major companies, which claim that attorneys
manipulate the system not to help consumers but to win huge legal fees. Big business often
settles the cases—even those considered frivolous—rather than face costly and lengthy
litigation.”).
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party had the resources to outlast or intimidate its opponent.48
Diverse segments of the bench and bar rallied for efficiency-based procedural reforms.49 Yet, divergent political and economic interests collided
over what should be done, who should benefit, and who should pay the
price. Disagreements over specific reforms turned toward the ideological—plaintiffs versus defendants, large versus small litigants, entrenched
institutions versus those seeking social structural change.50
What emerged comprised the First Wave of procedural reforms.51 It
encompassed expansive alternative dispute resolution,52 Rule 11 sanctions for filings challenging established legal norms,53 apparent heightened pleading requirements for civil rights plaintiffs,54 mandatory prefiling disclosures,55 limits on discovery,56 eased defendants’ summary

48. Halperin, supra note 36.
49. See, e.g., A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 219, 251 (1985); Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71
NW. U. L. REV. 767, 767–69, 781 (1977) (highlighting “increased government costs, a
clogged legal system, the impossibility of evenhanded law enforcement, a decline in respect
for the law, increased costs for private business”); see also Austin Sarat, The Litigation
Explosion, Access to Justice, and Court Reform: Examining the Critical Assumptions, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 319, 319–20 (1985); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case
Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
770, 770 (1981); Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique
and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1357 (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 319–20 (1985); Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided
Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 806, 808 (1981); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 547–55 (1986).
50. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 352–53.
51. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil
Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2014). Stephen N. Subrin and Thomas O. Main
characterized the historical evolution of civil procedure in four eras, or “waves,” starting
with the merger of law and equity and continuing to the present fourth wave procedural
changes. This helpful historical description differs from the two waves and interregnum as
described in this article.
52. See Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 360; see also id. at 407 (transforming minority litigation experience into a value of external participation, making a subordinated group’s voice heard by other groups); Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns
Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., Aug.1996, at 54, 55; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights
and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 611 (1986)
(examining rights discourse as expressions of human and communal values emphasizing
“the interdependence of autonomy and community”); Cheryl Holzmeyer, Human Rights in
an Era of Neoliberal Globalization: The Alien Tort Claims Act and Grassroots Mobilization
in Doe v. Unocal, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 271, 274 (2009) (employing legal mobilization
theory and “intertwining . . . broader structures of political opportunity, organizational
resources, and rights consciousness” for specific groups).
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (requiring reasonable attorney research into and assessment of
law and facts for all court filings).
54. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing the
shift to heightened fact pleading standards created by judicial activism).
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (self-executing “mandatory” disclosure of information to be
used to support claims or defenses).
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f), 26(b), 30, 32 (addressing pretrial conferences, including discovery plans, in Rule 26(f) and scope of discovery limitations in Rule 32).
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judgment standards, and more extensive pre-trial judge management.57
On the heels of the Civil Justice Reform Act,58 these procedural reforms
emerged after considerable public debate through a mélange of formal
judicial rulemaking amendments, legislative reforms, and court rulings.59
And the reforms extended well beyond complex cases. They revamped
important parts of the litigation process across the board.
I observed then that, whether or not intended, the efficiency-justified
changes noticeably diminished the capacity of the lesser empowered to
assert and maintain claims in court,60 erecting partial roadblocks to the
courthouse for consumers, employees, and public law litigants seeking social justice through the legal system.61 First Wave impediments thus
raised questions about systemic litigation fairness.62
B. INTERREGNUM
From roughly the early 1990s through the early 2000s, organized industry associations seized upon First Wave criticisms of undue cost and delay
and intensified the push for further procedural advantages. Those business groups lobbied Congress, local legislatures, rulemakers, and courts
to fix what they argued was a still broken system marked by wildly accelerating litigation costs.63 In doing so, businesses tied additional procedural changes to a forcefully asserted platform for substantive tort law
reform to protect overburdened business defendants.64 From a variety of
57. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 317–18 (1986) (allowing a defendant to
carry its initial burden of production on a motion for summary judgment by simply pointing to an “empty record”).
58. Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (Supp. 1991) (enacted as Title I of
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990)).
59. For an in depth description of the formal rulemaking process, see About the
Rulemaking Process, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/
about-rulemaking-process [https://perma.cc/ZD5U-WJNZ].
60. See Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 344–45; see also Miller, supra
note 13, at 309–13.
61. See Miller, supra note 13, at 304, 309–13, 359 (characterizing these partial roadblocks as “substantial procedural hurdles,” “obstacles,” and “stop signs”).
62. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 1, at 1906 (perceiving an undermining of legal system legitimacy).
63. The American Tort Reform Association lobbied hard for substantive and procedural reforms to “bring greater fairness, predictability and efficiency to America’s civil justice
system.” ATRA at a Glance, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/about/ [https://
perma.cc/6MMR-EAW7]. A 2006 survey of corporate counsel found that American companies on average spent $20 million on litigation, or 70% of their legal budgets, and recounted that “[h]igh legal costs and punitive damages in the U.S. were cited by more than
half of the foreign in-house lawyers as ‘a top concern about litigating a dispute in the
U.S.’” Survey: Litigation Big Burden for U.S. Corporations, TRIANGLE BUS. JOURNAL
(Oct. 10, 2006), http://www.bizjournals.com/triangle/stories/2006/10/09/daily14.html [Perma
link unavailable]. See also Michael D. Johnston, The Litigation Explosion, Proposed Reforms, and Their Consequences, 21 BYU. J. PUB. L. 179, 179 (2007) (concluding that costs
of litigation have increased substantially, citing a 1991 study finding that “over the last two
generations the cost of injury litigation rose fourteenfold after inflation, while the size of
the real U.S. economy rose threefold” (quoting WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (1991)).
64. Advocates of systemic reforms asserted that escalating litigation costs unfairly burdened especially big businesses, with higher prices passed on to customers. See Victor E.
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vantage points, many acknowledged an important value in preventing unfair burdens on business.65
But, according to knowledgeable critics, the “record shows . . . expense
and delay . . . [were] often the result of deliberate attempts by corporate
defendants—the very entities urging ‘tort reform’—to avoid disclosure of
critical information.”66 Indeed, an array of federal court judges and business commentators expressed consternation, if not revulsion, at the expanding trend of major corporations’ abuse of the litigation process to
escape exposure and accountability.67 One federal district judge highlighted a continuous scheme of corporate bad faith discovery.68 A federal
court of appeals found an “unrelenting [corporate] campaign to obfuscate
the truth,” remarking about the “disturbing regularity with which discovery abuses occur in our courts today.”69 The legal affairs editor of BusiSchwartz, Leah Lorber & Rochelle M. Tedesco, Taking a Stand Against Lawlessness in
American Courts: How Trial Court Judges and Appellate Justices Can Protect Their Courts
from Becoming Judicial Hellholes, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 215, 216 (2003) (cataloguing
reform arguments). They asserted that procedural and substantive laws were stacked
against large, particularly out of state, corporate defendants. Those laws created “judicial
hellholes” marked by “improper certification of class actions, admission of ‘junk science’
evidence, allowing attorneys to appeal to juror bias, and refusing to dismiss baseless
claims.” Id. In particular, the exorbitant costs of malpractice actions against doctors and
products liability class action suits against manufacturers and pharmaceutical companies,
brought by a “[s]ophisticated [and] [i]nnovative [p]laintiff’s [b]ar,” imposed excessive burdens on business. INS. INFO. INST., LIABILITY TRENDS, ISSUES, AND JURY VERDICTS: IMPACT ON INSURANCE LIABILITY AND EXCESS CASUALTY MARKETS (2003), http://www.iii
.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/liability.pdf [https://perma.cc/LN9V-D736]. But see Arthur
R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,”
and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 982, 985–86, 990–96 (2003) (acknowledging industry’s position about a “litigation
explosion” and its negative societal impacts warranting substantive and procedural law reforms, but also questioning industry data and reform arguments); Galanter, supra note 44,
at 5–7 (finding a lack of reliable empirical evidence to document the “litigation
explosion”).
65. See generally Levin & Colliers, supra note 49; Manning, supra note 49. See, e.g.,
Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 148 F.R.D. 362, 365 (S.D. Ga. 1991), aff’d sub nom.
Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1993); Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
66. See Halperin, supra note 36. David Halperin describes “tort reform” advocates
arguments about excessive litigation costs and delay but identifies significant systematic
corporate litigation discovery abuse as a primary reason, citing several courts’ sanctions on
corporate lawyers for excessive and bad faith discovery accompanied by sharp admonitions
about widespread corporate discovery abuse. See, e.g., Malautea, 148 F.R.D. at 376 (imposing the most severe sanction against Suzuki Motor Company (default) and its attorneys
(substantial fines) for willful pervasive litigation abuse).
67. See, e.g., Kawamata Farms, Inc. v. United Agri Products, 948 P.2d 1055, 1090
(Haw. 1997), as amended (Jan. 13, 2004) (imposing upon chemical manufacturer Du Pont a
$1.5 million sanction for intentionally misleading the court concerning key test records); In
re E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 918 F. Supp. 1524, 1556 (M.D. Ga. 1995) (sanctioning
a chemical manufacturer for defrauding the court “consciously, deliberately and with purpose” through its repeated discovery abuse); Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass’n v.
Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054 (1993) (sanctioning a drug manufacturer for deliberate discovery abuse).
68. See Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1993)
(“[D]efendants continually and willfully resisted discovery, even deliberately withholding
discoverable information that the judge had ordered them to produce.”).
69. Id. at 1544–46.
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ness Week confirmed this trend of “corporate foul play”: “Corporate foul
play in high-stakes cases appears to be increasing . . . destroying evidence,
striking secret deals, and stonewalling . . . . [I]t is difficult to recall a time
when so many respectable companies have been hit with court sanctions.”70 The business editor weighed in on the ethical significance: “[b]y
refusing to play by the rules, [those] companies undercut their moral authority to criticize the [United States] tort system.”71
Indeed, judges in a variety of cases imposed extraordinary sanctions
against businesses and their lawyers for “cheating and cheating consciously” in an effort to hide the merits and grind claimants and their
lawyers into economic submission.72 Public interest watchdogs suggested
a malign agenda: businesses generating a facade of a litigation crisis in
order to spur new procedural barriers to the pursuit of bona fide legal
claims, protecting manufacturers, large retailers, and financial
institutions.73
With mounting skepticism, judiciary rulemakers appeared to respond
haltingly to industry calls for further procedural reforms during this Interregnum74—the period roughly in-between the First and Second Waves,
the calm between the storms.75 With “relative restraint,”76 they refrained
from imposing heightened pleading standards for all plaintiffs, mandating
significantly stricter criteria for class action certification, further easing
defendants’ summary judgment evidentiary burdens, and extending compelled private arbitrations.77
Rulemakers did amend the discovery rules to limit (or tailor) discovery.78 Congress also passed the state-court limiting, and euphemistically
titled, “Class Action Fairness Act.”79 And judges stepped up active discovery management to better infuse “cost-benefit balancing factors” and
fairness into the resource-influenced pretrial process.80 On the whole,
however, rulemakers rejected calls for new major “efficiency” reforms.
70. Mike France, Commentary: Corporate Litigation: Playing Hardball is One
Thing . . . , BLOOMBERG (June 30, 1996, 11:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/1996-06-30/commentary-corporate-litigation-playing-hardball-is-one-thing-dot-dot-dot
[perma.cc/LJH3-MHEL].
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 148 F.R.D. 362, 373 (S.D. Ga. 1991),
aff’d sub nom. Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 863 (1993); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
73. See infra Section VI.D.
74. See supra Section II.B.
75. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation
Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L. J. 1559, 1592 (2015).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)–(b), 26(f), 30, 32; see also Spencer, supra note 14, at 359.
79. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2012).
80. See, e.g., Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 98 (D.
Md. 2003) (employing the cost-benefits proportionality principle to limit electronic discovery); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (infusing cost-benefit proportionality in determining the
scope of discovery).

2017]

Critical Procedure

C. THE SECOND WAVE: RULE CHANGING

777
BY

JUDICIAL FIAT

But business industry’s calls, it seems, reached a powerful new audience.81 A conservative Supreme Court majority picked up the cudgel. As
Burbank and Farhang’s 2015 study revealed, the “impulse for [judicial]
restraint was overwhelmed by a call to action from the Chief Justice
[Roberts].”82 Against strident dissents, the conservative majority,83
through case declarations, unilaterally imposed a number of the procedural changes that organized businesses advanced unsuccessfully in the
Interregnum.
Rather than alter the substantive law explicitly to favor large manufacturers, retailers, and employers, thereby generating strong public opposition, the five-justice majority affected the substantive shifts through
procedural rulings “far less likely to trigger group mobilization.”84 Burbank and Farhang’s study ascertained that under the veil of procedural
neutrality the “large transformation in private enforcement [narrowing
court access and claim development] resulted from a succession of individual Court decisions, none of which may have appeared monumental in
isolation.”85
In this Second Wave of procedural changes, commencing around the
mid-2000s, the Justice Antonin Scalia-led majority bypassed the established multi-layered checks-and-balances rulemaking process and often
jettisoned settled case precedent. Venerable procedure scholar Arthur
Miller calls it the “[d]eformation of [f]ederal [p]rocedure.”86 Others characterize it as ideologically driven procedural activism and rulemaking by
judicial fiat.87
81. Industry associations, defense lawyers, and politicians also endeavored to sharply
tilt the composition of the Rules Advisory Committee towards defendant-oriented interests, shifting the balance decidedly toward economically powerful businesses. Burbank &
Farhang, supra note 75, at 1591–92 (describing the intense political lobbying and maneuvering to generate conservative imbalance on the Advisory Committee).
82. Id. at 1594 n.131.
83. That majority consisted of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Alito, Justice Thomas, and Justice Kennedy, with Justice Scalia passing away in February 2016.
84. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 75, at 1594 (quoting Stephen B. Burbank & Sean
Farhan, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1581 (2014)).
85. Id. (describing a litigation reform agenda and how “since 1970 the Supreme
Court—increasingly conservative and influenced by ideology—has been more effective
than Congress in reducing opportunities and incentives for private enforcement [of federal
law through litigation]”).
86. See Miller, supra note 13, at 286.
87. The Second Wave was presaged by the conservative Court majority’s interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act that diverged from explicit congressional intent.
Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in a Box, or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us
About Law-Making, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 400–06 (2012) (suggesting that “[e]ven prior
to Concepcion, the Court’s arbitration decisions were replete with examples of judicial
interpretation divorced from congressional intent”).
In 1995, for example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor[, a moderately conservative justice,] noted:”[T]he Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining
congressional intent with respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by case,
an edifice of its own creation.” Justice John Paul Stevens also commented
that the [majority] has done more than “put its own imprint” on the FAA[.
Justice Stevens charged that the conservative majority misused its authority]
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With burdens on corporations and government officials in mind, the
conservative majority generated heightened fact-pleading for plaintiffs88—tasking judges with employing their “experience and common
sense” to assess whether plaintiffs pleaded enough specific facts to establish the “plausibility” of their claims.89 In doing so, the majority created a
“powerful new tool” for defendants90 and eliminated at the threshold a
swath of bona fide claims resting partly on incriminating evidence in defendants’ files.91
“[w]hen its refusal to look beyond the raw statutory text enables it to disregard countervailing considerations that were expressed by Members of the
enacting Congress and that remain valid.”
Id. at 399–400 (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
283 (1995) and Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (2001)). See also, infra
Section V(A) (describing other recent arbitration rulings by the Court’s conservative
majority).
88. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007), imposed a heightened
fact pleading requirement of “plausibility” for antitrust claims, replacing the “no set of
facts” standard reflected in FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)’s notice pleading regime and in the
interpretive language of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). The Court majority extended Twombly to all civil actions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), overturning
settled case law and effectively rewriting the language of Rule 8(a)(2). In doing so it posed
a “threat to access to justice” through the “erosion of notice pleading in the federal courts
in favor of a plausibility-pleading system that screens out potentially meritorious claims
that fail to offer sufficient specificity and support at the pleading stage.” A. Benjamin
Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA
L. REV. 1710, 1710 (2013).
89. According to proceduralist A. Benjamin Spencer, “[n]ot only did the Court sidestep the established rule amendment process to produce a novel rule of pleading (overturning Conley v. Gibson in the process), but the rule it announced was particularly
pernicious for its overinclusiveness, subjectivity, and disruptiveness.” Spencer, supra note
14, at 1712 (footnotes omitted). Responding to “apologists” supporting the change, Benjamin observes that their
efficiency view is misguided because (1) it is based on the positing of a problem—discovery abuse—that has not been confirmed to exist, and (2) the
remedy that Twombly and Iqbal have delivered to address the ailments that
efficiency proponents lament is poorly calibrated for the task, being grossly
subjective and overinclusive in ways that ensnare meritorious claims.
Id. at 1714. But see Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293,
1299 (2010) (“properly understood, the post-Iqbal pleading framework is not fundamentally in conflict with notice pleading”); Nathan Psyno, Should Twombly and Iqbal Apply to
Affirmative Defenses?, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1633, 1652–53 (2011) (extending the heightened
pleading requirement to defendants’ pleadings).
90. Stephen C. Yeazell & Joanna C. Schwartz, CIVIL PROCEDURE 402 (9th ed. 2016).
91. Professor Joe B. Gelbach’s study of judicial and litigant effects found that in employment and civil rights cases “switching from Conley to Twombly/Iqbal negatively affected plaintiffs in at least 15.4% and at least 18% of cases, respectively,” and that in noncivil rights, employment, or financial disclosure cases “Twombly/Iqbal negatively affected
at least 21.5% of plaintiffs facing” motions to dismiss. Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the
Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery,
121 YALE L. J. 2270, 2277–78 (2012). Professors Stephen Yeazell and Joanna Schwartz note
that these telling statistics “do not [even] take into account that litigants’ behavior might
change . . . . Some plaintiffs may decide not to file a lawsuit . . . or might settle . . . soon
after filing.” YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 90, at 402. They also observe that the
Twombly-Iqbal motion offers a “powerful new tool to [the] defendants” and has become a
time-consuming “staple of federal civil litigation.” Id.
“In the first 32 months after Twombly . . . judges cited it almost twice as many times
(22,990) as Erie Railroad v. Tompkins . . . was cited in the first 72 years after it was decided
(13,546 citations)! As of 2015, Iqbal was cited in more than 85,000 cases.” Id.
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The majority also shrank state and federal court jurisdictional reach
over foreign mass manufacturers, thereby impeding injured individuals’
efforts to conveniently sue out-of-state product manufacturers indirectly
marketing to claimants’ home states.92 And it sharply limited certification
of class actions against large multi-store companies like Wal-Mart, altering settled caselaw and judicial practice to erect a new stringent “commonality” prerequisite to impede collective actions by employees.93 In
doing so, it appeared to channel the extreme view of class actions against
large businesses as “legalized blackmail.”94
The majority also orchestrated a radical transformation of summary
judgment standards in qualified immunity civil rights damage cases and
significantly expanded interlocutory appellate jurisdiction95—markedly
expanding defendants’ summary adjudication prospects and litigation leverage while eroding plaintiffs’ path to trial on the merits (or settlement).
And it diminished the availability of the preliminary injunctive relief—
signaling forthcoming invalidation of the pro-plaintiff sliding scale test
and indicating the majority’s disaffection for a primary litigation tool of
environmental and civil rights claimants.96 And, as developed below, inte92. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 883 (2011) (constricting
court access by resurrecting Justice O’Connor’s restrictive Due Process minimum contacts
stream of commerce formulation for mass manufacturers); James M. Brogan, Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear and McIntyre One Step Forward; One Step Backward?, 34 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 811, 811–12 (2013) (furthering “conservative expectation[s]” in the effort to
“reign in state and federal district court[ ] . . . personal jurisdiction over both non-U.S.
affiliates of U.S based companies and non-U.S. based manufacturers”).
93. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348–55 (2011) (significantly narrowing Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement, erecting a major impediment for class certification of actions against large companies). Justice Scalia, for the five-member majority,
rejected the plain language of the applicable federal rule (which requires only a common
question of law or fact) and overturned settled caselaw and class action practice to drastically constrain employee class actions against large business employers. Id. See Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Wal-Mart’s Two Messages, SCOTUSBLOG (June 20, 2011, 2:02
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/06/opinion-analysis-wal-marts-two-messages/ [https:/
/perma.cc/ZZY2-D8WU] (observing that the opinion by Scalia, “the Court’s most dedicated skeptic about” class actions, sent the message that “the bigger the company, the
more varied and decentralized its job practices, the less likely it will have to face a classaction”); Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. & Bradley J. Hamburger, Three Myths About Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 45, 45 (2014) (substantially
“rais[ing] the bar for plaintiffs seeking class certification and . . . hav[ing] a significant
impact on all class actions for decades to come”).
94. See YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 90, at 861 (describing extreme critics’
framing of class actions as “legalized blackmail”). See generally Steven Greenberger, Justice Scalia and the Demise of the Employment Class Action, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
75, 83–84 (2017) (characterizing Scalia as going “out of his way to disparage the utility of
class-wide arbitration generally,” as viewing “class arbitration [as] fundamentally unfair to
defendants,” and as insisting on “reading his own policy preferences into the statute”).
95. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (significantly expanding defendant summary judgment prospects and litigation leverage in qualified immunity civil rights cases).
Professor Tobias Barrington Wolff characterizes the conservative majority’s ruling in Scott
as a “radical doctrinal reformation” that recasts core summary judgment standards to significantly expand interlocutory appellate jurisdiction in qualified immunity civil rights
cases, eroding the path to trial for all plaintiffs. Tobias Barrington Wolff, Scott v. Harris
and the Future of Summary Judgment, 15 NEV. L.J. 1351, 1352 (2015).
96. See Winter v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (signaling forthcoming majority rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s pro-plaintiff sliding scale preliminary injunc-
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gral to the Second Wave, at the behest of large businesses and institutions, the Court’s conservative majority also significantly expanded the
grasp of compelled private, individualized arbitration.97
Under the encompassing shroud of efficiency,98 both the First and Second Waves of procedural changes benefitted some, and perhaps many, at
times making litigation quicker and more streamlined.99 In differing
ways, however, the changes also collectively constricted court access for
those with bona fide justice claims, discouraged collective actions, constrained preliminary remedies, limited claim development by curtailing
discovery,100 and, especially significantly, privatized and individualized an
increasingly wider swath of controversies.101
These changes reflect what Professor A. Benjamin Spencer calls the
prevailing “restrictive ethos” in “procedure today, with many rules being
developed, interpreted, and applied in a manner that frustrates the ability
of claimants to prosecute their claims and receive a decision on the merits.”102 U.S. District Judge Weinstein observes that the restrictive ethos
hides behind the “guise of procedural efficiency” and burdens the “weak
and the aggrieved unfairly.”103
Critical procedure inquiry, described in the next section, illuminates
how large businesses and institutional litigants tend to benefit significantly at the expense of those with markedly less economic and political
power.104 Some therefore view the ongoing Second Wave as a judge-generated “alternate system of justice” for big business105 that may be “undermin[ing] the legitimacy of the legal system.106 And at the heart of it
all, developed in Sections IV and V following, lies alternative dispute resolution and the Supreme Court’s AMEX and Concepcion rulings.
tion test); cf. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011)
(determining that at least initially the sliding-scale test survives Winter). See generally Elisabeth Long, Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell: Raising “Serious Questions” About
Post-Winter Injunctive Relief in the Ninth Circuit, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 643, 643–44 (2012).
97. See infra Section VI.
98. See Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 359–60, 362, 371–72 (describing the multi-faceted push for efficiency-reforms in response to mounting claims of excessive litigation costs and undue delay, including ADR, an amended Rule 11 in 1983, civil
rights pleading requirements, and reformulated summary judgment standards).
99. Some alternative dispute programs reduced costs for litigants and courts. The 1983
version of Rule 11 required attorneys to more rigorously screen claims, defenses, and motions throughout the court process. New pretrial conference and discovery rules invested
judges with greater managerial authority. See Peckham, supra note 49, at 770–73; see also
Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 361–62.
100. Amendments to Rule 26 aimed to limit the scope of discovery. See Tobias, supra
note 35, at 270, 292 (discussing originally unforeseen impacts of public law litigation);
Chayes, supra note 34, at 1284 (coining the term and describing the attributes of “public
law litigation”).
101. See infra Section VI.D.
102. Spencer, supra note 14, at 353–54 (footnote omitted).
103. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 1906.
104. See infra Section VI.
105. Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 2.
106. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 1906.
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III. CRITICAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
A developing critical procedure offers analytical tools for interrogating
the often under-explored facets of present-day ADR—particularly how
the Court’s AMEX and Concepcion rulings are integral to the Second
Wave’s overall constriction of court access and claim development for
those of comparatively lesser power. Critical procedure provides a contextual lens for this inquiry.107 As a complement to and departure from
traditional legal analysis, it posits that “formalist notions of efficiency,
neutrality and fairness have obscured the cumulative effects and attendant value judgments of procedural reforms.”108 From the vantage point of
those lesser empowered, it interrogates
what is really at stake, who benefits and who is harmed (in the short
and long term), who wields the behind-the-scenes power, which social values are supported and which are subverted, how political [or
economic] concerns frame the legal questions, and how societal institutions and differing segments of the populace will be affected by the
court’s decision[s].109
Critical procedure emerges from critical legal studies and critical race
theory of the 1980s–1990s110 and new legal realism’s continuing socio107. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 345. For efforts undergirding the
development of a critical procedural inquiry, see also Stephen N. Subrin, Martha L. Minow, Mark S. Brodin, Thomas O. Main & Alexandra Lahav, CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT (4th ed. 2012); ROY L. BROOKS, CRITICAL PROCEDURE
3–5 (1998); Eric K. Yamamoto, Moses Haia & Donna Kalama, Courts and the Cultural
Performance: Native Hawaiians’ Uncertain Federal and State Law Rights to Sue, 16 U.
HAW. L. REV. 1, 6, 19 (1994); Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6; David M.
Trubek, The Handmaiden’s Revenge: On Reading and Using the Newer Sociology of Civil
Procedure, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 111–12 (1988); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987); Schneider, supra note 52, at 589–90.
108. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 345; see D. Kapua‘ala Sproat, Wai
Through Kânâwai: Water for Hawai‘i’s Streams and Justice for Hawaiian Communities, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 127, 154–55 (2011) (defining legal formalism as the view of law as an “‘internally consistent and logical body of rules that is’ . . . ‘objective, unchanging, extrinsic to
the social climate, and, above all, different from and superior to politics’” (quoting BRIAN
Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN
JUDGING 2 (2009) and Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV.
731, 731 (2009)).
109. Eric K. Yamamoto, White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to
Hold the President Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
285, 291–92 (2005) (characterizing critical legal inquiry).
110. “Critical legal studies” and “critical race theory” have both played a significant
role in advancing critical legal analyses. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 3–5 (2d ed. 2012) (engaging critical theory analysis in race and law); EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, BEYOND RATIONAL
CHOICE: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMICS (2006) (employing critical legal theory to critique and remake standard economic analysis of justice issues); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil
Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 827–28 (1997) (calling for pragmatic linkage of
critical race theory to frontline legal justice practice); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism
Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 532–33 (1988) (describing critical legal theory inquiry with
roots in legal realism); Schneider, supra note 52, at 597–98 (employing critical legal theory
to assess and advance the feminist deployment of the litigation process).
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legal study of the litigation process.111 Critical procedure advances a
sharp “changing . . . narrative [in] civil procedure”: “[A]ny attempt to
understand procedural reform without attention to the legal and political
philosophies [and interests] of its supporters and opponents, and without
setting it in broader social [and political] context, is doomed.”112 Critical
procedure thus explicitly and systematically integrates “changing social
dynamics and consequences”113 into its assessments.
Viewed in this light, critical procedure serves as a framework for realistically evaluating the impact of procedural changes. That framework is
operationalized through insights into a given procedure’s (or group of
procedures’) genesis, interpretation, application, alteration, and
consequences.114
A. EMPOWERING/DISEMPOWERING
The first critical procedure insight highlights procedure as “an instrument of power.”115 It stimulates inquiry into the impacts of litigation procedure on the empowerment or disempowerment of social groups.116
111. A “new legal realism” by scholars who appear to span a wide political spectrum,
bolstered by empirical studies, is grounded in rejecting the formalist legal method as a
description of how the legal process actually operates and in seeking to interrogate the
ways in which law actually functions. See Sproat, supra note 108, at 160–61 (describing
legal realist analysis as a jurisprudential reaction to the inadequacy of the formalist legal
method); Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 6 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 341 (2010); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal
Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 832–34 (2008); Howard Erlanger et al., Is It Time for a
New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335, 336–37 (2005); Daniel A. Farber, Toward a
New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 303 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
112. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 75, at 1563.
113. See Steve Subrin, Reflections, 15 NEV. L.J. 1689, 1691 (2015); see generally Edward
A. Purcell, Jr., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL
POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
257 (2000); see also CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE AND CONTEXT, supra note
107; Singer, supra note 110, at 501 (contending that judges should decide cases in part
“based on a thorough understanding of contemporary social reality” and by “closely examin[ing] the social context in which those affected by legal rules operate”).
114. In 1988 amid the First Wave reforms, Robert M. Cover, Owen M. Fiss, and Judith
Resnik laid an important foundation for critical procedural inquiry. ROBERT M. COVER,
OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE (1988). The casebook explored the “Values
of Procedure” and their significance in “Strategic Interactions (including the “Ideology of
Advocacy”). It then cast procedural study as a realist endeavor, examining “Information in
a Strategic Context,” the “Strategic Manipulation of the Costs of Information,” and the
“Powers and Attributes of Decisionmakers.” It also cast procedural inquiry as highly interactive with political constituencies, encompassing the “Role of an Audience,” “Coping with
Membership in Multiple Communities,” “Hierarchical Structures,” “Anti-Procedure,” and
“Political Preclusion.” Id. at xiii–xv.
115. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1471
(1987); Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 397 (characterizing “[p]rocedural
discretion . . . as a potential ‘instrument of power’”).
116. See ROY BROOKS, supra note 107, at 196 (describing the transformative power of
class action lawsuits, particularly when initiated by those of lesser power, and also noting
the disempowering effect of class certification denials); see also Yamamoto, Efficiency’s
Threat, supra note 6, at 404–07 (valuing empowerment of social groups through three related aspects of procedural power: personal autonomy, community-building, and group
mobilization); Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place;
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More specifically, it reveals ways that the litigation process enables people to coalesce because of group commonalities (including identity or
similar harms) in joint pursuit of claims117 or forces them to disaggregate
and pursue claims in isolation.118 It inquires into ways that procedure empowers communities to deploy litigation as a centerpiece for social justice
organizing119 or compels them to individually litigate hyper-technical
pieces of a controversy devoid of larger social content.120 And it assesses
how procedure enables claimants to seek behavior-altering group remedies or impels them to craft narrow, individualized relief that, even when
Asserting Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 42 (1989) (placing collective empowerment of black women into the framework of rights discourse); see generally Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 15–17 (1987) (analyzing importance of
perceived differences between groups, especially male and female groups, in empowering
at times and disempowering at other times groups in constitutional adjudication); Schneider, supra note 52, at 640 (explaining how a collective empowerment, translated through
legal formulation and demand for power, emerged out of the women’s rights movement);
see also Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C. L. REV. 303, 373 (1986) (explaining how “[c]onstitutional litigation itself performs a
similar unifying function, for it is a process in which ideology is reinforced by the behavior
of litigants and of legal professionals, including judges”).
117. For example, class certification enables disparate individuals with related claims to
join together and generate group-based power in asserting claims against large businesses
and government. See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1042–43,
1044–45 (2016) (affirming lower court’s class certification in a suit that centered on violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, enabling individual moderate value claimants to
band together to sue); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 458–59
(2013) (certifying federal securities fraud class action). Class actions are one prominent
form of procedural coalescence. Coalescence can also occur through liberal joinder rules
that allow claimants with similar injuries to collectively sue in one lawsuit and thereby
leverage their power. See, e.g., Mosley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330, 1333–34 (8th
Cir. 1974) (allowing a broad plaintiffs’ joinder in an employment discrimination case).
118. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2416–17
(2014) (vacating securities fraud class action certification for lack of “predominance” at the
class certification stage); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 30, 34 (2013) (denying
certification of customers’ antitrust class action); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S.
338, 349–50 (2011) (narrowing class certification prospects by changing the commonality
prerequisite, relegating the class members to pursue individual litigation or to abandon
their claims entirely); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336, 349–50, 351
(2011) (compelling individualized arbitration based on hypertechnical analysis of federal
preemption of state law prohibiting forced contractual waiver of class actions); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (effectively invalidating class
arbitration).
119. See Michael W. McCann, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 10, 68–74 (1994) (describing McCann’s empirical research on the indirect but springboard effect of litigation on social justice movements);
Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a Social Movement Strategy, 96 IOWA L.
REV. BULL. 61, 68 (2011) (referencing McCann’s insight “that simply playing the litigation
game can have important benefits for movement actors and organizations”); Ann Southworth, The Rights Revolution and Support Structures for Rights Advocacy, 34 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 1203, 1209 (2000) (describing “how rights are claimed and negotiated in a wide variety of settings, including courts but also legislatures, agencies, the workplace, the media,
public squares and private interactions . . . and how these various forms of activism influence one another in complex ways”); Güneş Murat Tezcür, Judicial Activism in Perilous
Times: The Turkish Case, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 305, 312 (2009) (conceiving litigation as a
“social movement tactic” potentially employed by the lesser empowered).
120. See BROOKS, supra note 107, at xxvii (explaining how “procedural law can frustrate the assertion of substantive rights” and impede community organizing).
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awarded, tends to preserve the institutional status quo.121
B. EXPOSING

THE

MYTH

OF

INHERENT NEUTRALITY

The second critical procedure insight dispels the myth of inherent procedural neutrality.122 Procedure’s patina of neutrality (it is only process,
not substance) at times disguises significant substantive consequences.123
Particular procedural rules—in their formulation, interpretation, application, and alteration—implicate substantive value choices. For instance,
studies found that amended Rule 11’s facially neutral, stepped up sanctioning of “frivolous” filings actually emerged from intense behind-thescenes plaintiffs versus defendants battles over substantive impacts—
whether the revamped sanctioning rule should be structured in a way that
chilled civil rights claimants and their lawyers as well as those asserting
novel theories of defendant liability.124 Indeed, follow-up studies revealed disproportionate sanctioning in civil rights cases and a marked decline in discrimination filings.125
Critical procedure lifts the veil of inherent neutrality to reveal an often
121. See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22–23 (2008) (reversing
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ preliminary injunction by invoking the Navy’s overriding interest in realistic sonar training exercises); see also Richard Delgado, The Ethereal
Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 301, 304 (1987) (“With much fanfare, the powerful periodically distribute rights as
proof that the system is fair and just, and then quietly deny rights through narrow construction, nonenforcement, or delay.”).
122. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice:
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 517, 519–22 (2010) (showing the disparate impact upon civil rights and employment
discrimination litigation); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics, and Power, 52
J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 344 (2002) (acknowledging statistically significant differential impacts
on similarly situated litigants when the veil is lifted on the “myth of neutrality”); Jack B.
Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 827, 836–39 (1993) (explaining that procedural changes are often made for ostensibly
but not actually neutral reasons).
123. See Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 396–97.
In creating or reforming a procedural system, people bring to bear particular
viewpoints not only about specific procedural rules but also about substantive issues and fundamental purposes of adjudication . . . [that] shape their
sense of a system’s appropriate scope, costs and benefits, which affects their
structuring and operation . . . . Uniform rules of procedure are thus no longer
viewed as inherently substance-neutral or litigant-neutral in operation . . . .
Procedural form and substantive results are at times inextricably bound.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
124. See, e.g., Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1082 (7th Cir.
1987) (exacting Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel for asserting minority contractor’s novel racial discrimination claims and thereby dissuading similar future claims);
Lepucki v. Van Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1985) (sanctioning plaintiff’s attorney
and generating a chilling effect on other claimant’s pursuit of similar claims); see also Eric
K. Yamamoto & Danielle K. Hart, Rule 11 and State Courts: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?,
13 U. HAW. L. REV. 57, 104 (1991) (describing highly disproportionate rates of Rule 11
sanctions levied against civil rights plaintiffs, substantially impacting their right and ability
to access litigation).
125. Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 124, at 103–04.
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politicized process of rule formation and alteration.126 This veil lifting exposes parries and thrusts over “neutral” efficiency procedural shifts maneuvers that alter the impact of substantive law by affecting court access
and claim development in ways that benefit some over others.127 It thus
expands procedural inquiry beyond ordinary costs and burdens into the
realm of social and economic consequences for individuals, organizations,
governments, communities, businesses, and the judiciary itself.
C. ADVANTAGING/DISADVANTAGING SOME

OVER

OTHERS

The third, and related, critical procedure insight reveals how procedure’s differential effects, at times by design, substantively advantage
those more economically powerful128 and disadvantage outsiders of lesser
power, especially those challenging established political, social, or economic arrangements.129 I observed during the First Wave that efficiency
reforms tended to discourage litigants on society’s margins by compelling
privatized dispute resolution, imposing punitive sanctions for cuttingedge filings, requiring greater factual support for some civil right filings,
126. From the early 1980s, the public pressured Congress and the judiciary to make the
legal system more efficient. Professor Lori Johnson observed that “[f]rom the 1930s to the
early 1970s, judicial branch committees dominated the process, and Congress uniformly
accepted their recommendations. Then Congress began to express much more interest in
the rules for federal courts, and the environment of procedural rulemaking became increasingly politicized.” Lori A. Johnson, Creating Rules of Procedure for Federal Courts:
Administrative Prerogative or Legislative Policymaking?, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 23, 23 (2003); see
also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of
Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 613–14 (2001).
127. See Margaret Y.K. Woo, Manning the Courthouse Gates: Pleadings, Jurisdiction,
and the Nation-State, 15 NEV. L.J. 1261, 1281 (2015) (recognizing that the “benign focus on
efficiency” and conservation of judicial resources often results in steeper procedural hurdles with negative consequences for plaintiffs); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Failing Faith in Class Actions: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 74 (2011) (identifying the courts’ value judgment that
large companies need protection from litigation to enhance profitability even at the expense of claimants with potentially meritorious claims); Spencer, supra note 14, at 361–62,
366–70 (“Civil procedure tends to . . . protect[ ] commercial defendants against claims by
members of various out-groups.”); Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as a Vindicator of Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2192 (1989) (observing that certain
types of potential litigants are more severely impacted by a “neutral” rule to deter frivolous filings because their social situation generates disproportionate numbers of claims
deemed frivolous by current norms).
128. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1613 (2014) (analyzing Congress’s protection of the institutional status quo in rulemaking); see also Stempel, supra note 126, at 532 (describing
post-1976 Federal Civil Rules’ advantages to defendants); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24
CONN. L. REV. 363, 368 (1992) (assessing the changing face of American jurisprudence
through legal realism, “exposing the result-oriented, value-laden nature of legal decisionmaking” in racial justice cases).
129. See Miller, supra note 13, at 304, 309–10, 322 (altering the procedural landscape
primarily at the expense of societal outsiders by constructing “substantial procedural hurdles,” “obstacles,” and “stop signs” for those attempting to change prevailing law); see also
Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 420–21 (describing the disproportionately
high price paid by outsiders, through diminished court access, for the systemic efficiency
reforms); Delgado, supra note 121, at 308–09 (illuminating political and economic interests
influencing legal decisionmaking and replicating power hierarchies and perpetuating the
socio-economic subordination of outsiders).
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shrinking the “information-gathering process and erect[ing] tougher obstacles to juries. They pared down the system of public adjudication” in
ways that benefitted some but not others.130
Professor Brooke Coleman’s recent study finds that the procedural limits on court access are in fact preventing plaintiffs from pursuing substantively meritorious claims.131 This insight opens to scrutiny the political
and economic underpinnings of the fights over procedural reform.132 It
casts an eye on how procedural changes are affecting who wins and who
loses in terms of both legal outcomes and broad social and economic
consequences.133
D. ARTICULATING PUBLIC VALUES/SHAPING PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS
Building upon the others, the fourth critical procedure insight identifies
the importance of the litigation of cutting-edge claims to public values
articulation and to a reshaping of mainstream public consciousness about
what is right and just.134 It underscores the dynamic interplay of pleadings, discovery, motions, and trial with parties, judges, community advocates, and media in imbuing social meaning to the “public”135 in public
law litigation. For this reason, the fourth insight sees courts as more than
forums for dispute resolution. They are also dynamic sites of cultural
performances.136
130. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 344.
131. Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 503
(2012).
132. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 128, at 1600–01 (noting the reluctance of
rulemakers to become direclty involved in controversies and who therefore accede to those
lobbying the hardest); see also Stempel, supra note 126, at 613–14 (acknowledging the
“pressure points of political power” and the procedural reform movement’s receptiveness
to conservative political and economic ideology).
133. See Trubek, supra note 107, at 129–31 (focusing on subtle changes of power on
who wins and who loses in ADR’s shifting focus from vindication of rights to satisfaction of
needs).
134. See Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye Yun Kim & Abigail M. Holden, American
Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 56 (2007).
“[R]esearch on legal consciousness suggests that ‘over time, . . . law norms may alter what
both governmental actors and larger populations view as “right,” “natural,” “just,” or “in
their interest.”‘ Even unsuccessful litigation of redress claims can help generate new understandings of history . . . , sources of group harm . . . , and remedy.” Id. See also Anthony E.
Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985, 993 (1990) (assessing a need for solid mechanisms to
transform theories of reconstituted community articulating public values).
135. See Sproat, supra note 108, at 168 (describing how political perspectives play a
significant role in shaping adjudicatory outcomes and how ideological views of justices
have substantial impact on decisions); see also Yamamoto, Haia & Kalama, supra note 107,
at 19–21 (describing the interplay of claims, defenses, pleading, discovery, and motions—in
the public eye through media—as a cultural performance that at times uplifts counternarratives to prevailing public understandings of injustice and need for rectification).
136. Yamamoto, Haia & Kalama, supra note 107, at 6; see also Gerald Torres &
Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian
Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 628 (1990); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2440–41 (1988); David M. Forman, A
Room for “Adam and Steve” at Mrs. Murphy’s Bed and Breakfast: Avoiding the Sin of
Inhospitality in Places of Public Accommodation, 23 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 326, 382
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“Courts and the cultural performance,”137 I have observed, at times
produce transformations in sociocultural practices and in public consciousness. Where rights claims challenge prevailing social or economic
arrangements, the status quo often wins out. In these instances the legal
process reinforces inequality or power imbalance in existing relationships.138 At other times, the confluence of creative claim framing, assertive lawyering, political organizing, and an attentive media uplift counter
narratives about injustice and rectification,139 irrespective of formal legal
outcomes.140 In these instances, the litigation process becomes “liberatory, opposing or reconfiguring entrenched group images and
relationships.”141
The litigation process, through subpoena power, enables participants to
discover previously private information and develop claims and defenses.
Through pleadings, discovery, motions, and trial itself, parties are empowered to organize, assert, and publicize counter narratives that challenge dominant understandings, or master narratives, undergirding unfair
political or social arrangements.142 In this way, public law litigation is not
(2012); Julian Aguon, Comment, Other Arms: The Power of a Dual Rights Legal Strategy
for the Chamoru People of Guam Using the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in U.S. Courts, 31 U. HAW. L. REV. 113 (2008).
137. For further explication and application of Courts and the Cultural Performance, see
Susan K. Serrano, The Human Costs of “Free Association”: Socio-Cultural Narratives and
the Legal Battle for Micronesian Health in Hawai‘i, 47 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1377, 1381
n.19 (2014) (exploring Courts and the Cultural Performance as the cultural narrative of
Micronesian people in Hawai‘i barred from requisite healthcare under Compact of Free
Association); Forman, supra note 136, at 382–83 (citing Courts and the Cultural Performance regarding gay and lesbian justice debates); Nancy Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness: Beyond Formal Equality and Antisubordination Strategies in Gay Legal Theory, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 879 n.53 (2000) (examining how law reflects social forces and how those
forces are implicated in Courts and the Cultural Performance); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial
Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 405, 440 n.156 (2000) (assessing competing cultural narratives as an expansion of the
“master-narratives” and “counter-narratives” through a Courts and the Cultural Performance lens); Danielle Kie Hart, Same-Sex Marriage Revisited: Taking a Critical Look at
Baehr v. Lewin, 9 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 109–10, 112 (1998) (revisiting the same-sex
marriage debate viewed through a contextualized lens, as explained in Courts and the Cultural Performance); Sally Engle Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 889,
892 (1991) (expanding upon the idea of cultural performances as dynamic forums for
events that produce transformations in sociocultural practices and general consciousness).
138. Yamamoto, Haia & Kalama, supra note 107, at 21.
139. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, supra note 134, at 63 (2007) (“[S]ocio-legal research finds that a ‘most stunning example of law’s constitutive powers is the willingness of
persons’ to try to shape themselves into the ‘kind of beings the law implies they are—and
needs them to be.’”); see also Judith Resnik, The Contingency of Openness in Courts:
Changing the Experiences and Logics of the Public’s Role in Court-Based ADR, 15 NEV.
L.J. 1631, 1643 (2015) (viewing courts “as sources of new understandings of what ‘equal’
means”).
140. See Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 398 (“[a]cknowledging the
[r]ole of [a]djudication in the [d]evelopment of [p]ublic [v]alues”).
141. See Yamamoto, Haia & Kalama, supra note 107, at 17–18 (describing the transformation of group images and relationships, especially in legal disputes “reflective of a larger
on-going social-political controversy”). See also supra notes 135–37.
142. Yamamoto, Haia & Kalama, supra note 107, at 21–25 n.58 (“A court’s cultural
performances can contribute to reinforcing [the] prevailing narratives or to elevating countering ones . . . [and] [t]hose [court] performances sometimes aid in the transformation of
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merely a process for resolving disputes.143 It is also a process that sometimes transforms narrow legal claims into larger public messages about
social justice.144
Highly-public litigation becomes a vehicle for those without effective
access to elective or bureaucratic power to participate actively in public
debates about social controversies and to shape larger societal understandings and policymaker actions over time.145
E. ACKNOWLEDGING POLITICS

AND

IDEOLOGY MATTERS

The final critical procedure insight is that politics and ideology sometimes matter. This insight connects the others, and it reflects a twist on
the familiar idea that “context matters.”146 When procedural shifts generate markedly non-neutral impacts, substantially advantaging some over
others, the idea that ideology matters explicitly directs inquiry toward the
politics of procedure. That inquiry examines political and economic influences, with an emphasis on underlying value preferences that determine
practical consequences.147
indigenous peoples’ disputes into public messages, discounting or highlighting the perspective, and silencing or enhancing the voice, of the group.”); see Aguon, supra note 136, at
121–22 n.51 (transforming disputes in part by reshaping cultural narratives illustrative of
courts as theaters and the performances they produce being as important as their
judgments).
143. Subrin, supra note 113, at 1691 (recognizing impacts of court process extending
beyond resolution of specific disputes).
144. See Yamamoto, Haia & Kalama, supra note 107, at 19–21 (describing the litigation
phenomenon of “dispute transformation” through the expansion of claims from narrow
private disputes into public controversies).
145. See Yamamoto, Kim & Holden, supra note 134, at 63 (“[S]ocio-legal research finds
that a ‘most stunning example of law’s constitutive powers is the willingness of persons’ to
try to shape themselves into the ‘kind of beings the law implies they are—and needs them
to be.’”); Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, The Subterranean Counterrevolution: The
Supreme Court, the Media, and Litigation Retrenchment, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 293, 293
(2016) (“An extensive body of research in political science, law, history, and sociology has
established that, beginning with the ‘rights revolution’ of the 1960s and 1970s, the role of
lawsuits and courts in the creation and implementation of public policy in the United
States has grown dramatically.”); see also Yamamoto, Haia & Kalama, supra note 107, at 6
(describing how indigenous groups are using the courts to “help focus cultural issues, to
illuminate institutional power arrangements and to tell counter-stories in ways that assist
larger social-political movements”).
146. See generally Martha Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1597 (1990); Brian Z. Tamanaha, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM
AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW 39–41 (1997); Eric K. Yamamoto, Carly Minner & Karen
Winter, Contextual Strict Scrutiny, 49 HOW. L.J. 241 (2006).
147. Professor A.E. Dick Howard’s study reveals that “external politics have affected
the inner workings” of the Supreme Court and that “today’s Court faces even lower approval ratings and seems to be more politically and ideologically driven and divided than
ever.”
[E]xternal politics have affected the inner workings of the institution. Perhaps life at the Court is different in good part because politics outside the
Court have become more polarized. The increased diversity on the bench, a
decline in consensus, the combative nomination process, the hiring of clerks
from ideologically compatible “feeder judges,” and media portrayals of the
Court all carry political overtones.
A.E. Dick Howard, The Changing Face of the Supreme Court, 101 VA. L. REV. 231, 315–16
(2015).
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This is because procedure is neither value-free nor a technical science.148 Both in formulation and operation, procedural systems embody
often contested value choices about the importance of resources (or lack
thereof) in resolving disputes; about whether similarly situated individuals should be allowed to band together to enter the courthouse and access
the tools of factual discovery (particularly for discovery of private information located in defendants’ files); about the significance of preliminary
injunctive relief in forestalling damaging conduct at the risk of disrupting
business or government operations; about the impact of the legal process
in reshaping seemingly oppressive social relations and thus about the importance of boundary-shifting social justice claims; and about the storytelling, public-educating functions of the legal process.149
These insights direct inquiry into the proclivities of those behind procedural decisionmaking.150 At its most basic, critical procedure undertakes
a realist assessment of the extent to which procedural changes by legislators, rulemakers, and judges are guided, at least partly, by ideological
preferences for those of greater social and economic power151 over those
of lesser stature and power.152 Or vice versa. Politics—with a small “p”—
sometimes matters.

148. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 396.
149. See Woo, supra note 127 and accompanying text.
150. As Professor Subrin observes about procedural shifts substantively benefitting
some over others:
[T]he great discretion given to trial judges under the initial Federal Rule regime, augmented by the subjectivity inherent in deciding motions to dismiss
at the pleading and summary judgment stages under current procedural jurisprudence, has resulted in a distinctly anti-plaintiff bias, especially in civil
rights cases. Our inevitable prejudices as human beings, including the biases
of judges, tend not to be dampened by current federal civil procedure.
Subrin, supra note 113, at 1691; Carter, supra note 127, at 2192 (as a federal judge, observing that amended Rule 11 had been applied in a manner evincing “extraordinary substantive bias” against individuals suing businesses); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules,
Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2050 (1989) (“[M]any individual procedural rules or clusters of
rules have an inherently political aspect, in that they favor or disfavor types of cases or
litigants.”). Professor Margaret Woo observes, “[d]espite the seemingly benign focus on
efficiency and conserving judicial resources, scholars are finding that the increase in pretrial dispositions with earlier and steeper procedural hurdles often results in negative consequences for plaintiffs,” particularly for those with lesser resources. Woo, supra note 127,
at 1281.
151. See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 44, at 5–6 (empirically analyzing court filing rates
and finding unsupported powerful litigation players’ contention that a “litigation explosion” justifies procedural reforms limiting court access and claim development); Miller,
supra note 13, at 982 (echoing Galanter’s analysis and observing how “[e]fficiency
[c]lichés” are being advanced by powerful interests to push procedural changes that erode
“[o]ur [d]ay [i]n [c]ourt”).
152. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 75, at 1560 (“In contrast to this limited legislative success in retrenching private enforcement . . . in the period 1970 through 2013, Supreme Court justices have increasingly forged majorities for anti-private-enforcement
decisions and that the justices’ votes on those issues have been increasingly influenced by
ideology, leading to a wide gap between the Court’s liberals and conservatives.”).
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IV. “ADR: WHERE HAVE THE CRITICS GONE?”
Early critical procedure critiques of ADR as a part of the First Wave of
efficiency procedural reforms set the stage for grappling now with ADR’s
integral role in the ongoing Second Wave. A brief step back into First
Wave history is warranted.
A. ADR AMID FIRST WAVE REFORMS
As a centerpiece of First Wave reforms, ADR appeared to have many
benefits. It shortened and reduced the cost of dispute resolution for
some.153 Participants paid less for lawyers.154 It allowed the judiciary to
pay less for judges, staff, and juries.155 ADR promoted early dispute resolution through settlement and de-emphasized winning or losing by court
decree. ADR seemed to work for ordinary disputes and disputants. The
benefits of ADR appeared to address legitimate concerns of undue cost
and delay in adjudication.
ADR spread rapidly through the procedural system and beyond. Statemandated court-annexed arbitration systems proliferated.156 Congress
authorized selective mandatory arbitration of cases.157 Members of the
Supreme Court were supportive.158 Private arbitrators, operating in camera with minimal discovery, without formal evidentiary constraints, and,
in a limited time frame, disposed of a vast array of cases.
ADR and the First Wave reforms collectively altered the litigation
landscape, at times for the better.159 But, scholars in the early 1990s embracing a critical perspective on law and legal process contested crucial
aspects of hastening ADR developments, seeing ADR’s potential as a
double-edged sword.160
B. OUTSIDER CRITIQUES

OF

ADR

Amid the First Wave, I described early critiques of ADR’s ideological
153. See generally Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 426 (1986).
154. See id. at 434.
155. See id. at 432.
156. Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 54, 55
(describing the proliferation of efficiency based, court-initiated, and court-enforced ADR
programs).
157. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 651–58 (Westlaw 2017). Some federal district courts implemented
effective multi-faceted ADR programs, with designated ADR magistrate judges. See
Wayne D. Brazil, Judicial Mediation of Cases Assigned to the Judge for Trial, DISP. RESOL.
MAG., Spring 2011, at 24, 24–25 (addressing mediation).
158. Ken Kobayashi, Kennedy Decries Defeat of Pay Raise for Judges, HONOLULU
STAR-BULLETIN, Aug. 6, 1989, at A13.
159. For an extensive discussion of how the First Wave reforms altered the litigation
landscape for outsiders, see Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6; see also Subrin &
Main, supra note 51, at 1853–56; Miller, supra note 13, at 309–13; Robert G. Bone, The
Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 900–02 (1999).
160. Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 4, at 1058 n.17.
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dimensions, particularly its effects on societal outsiders.161 Richard Delgado, Trina Grillo, and others examined ADR’s structure and its shortcomings.162 Delgado’s seminal article, Fairness and Formality:
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, explored ADR’s risks for racial minorities, women, and the poor.163 These
societal outsiders, according to Delgado, were more likely to suffer
prejudice in an informal ADR setting than in formal adjudication that
“tend[s] to suppress bias[es].”164 Trina Grillo’s research confirmed this. It
determined that ADR failed its essential purposes in child custody disputes and divorce proceedings.165 “Mediation, without the process protections of adjudication, often left women unprotected from more
161. Id. at 1058–62 (citing commentary by scholars Richard Delgado, Owen Fiss,
Marjorie Silver, Trina Grillo, John Esser, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, and Kim Dayton,
among others).
162. See generally Richard Delgado, ADR and the Dispossessed: Recent Books About
the Deformalization Movement, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 145 (1988); Richard Delgado et
al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce
Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992); Kim Dayton, The Myth
of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889 (1991); Harry
T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668
(1986); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Michele G. Hermann,
The Dangers of ADR: A Three-Tiered System of Justice, 3 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 117
(1989–1990); David Luban, Bargaining and Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation and
Informal Justice, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 397 (1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or “The Law of ADR”, 19
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991); Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482 (1987); Jana B.
Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443 (1992).
163. Delgado et al., supra note 162, at 1388–99. Delgado succinctly elucidates the effect
of informality on parties of unequal power:
[F]ormal legal institutions begin with a presumption of inequality between
the parties and construct elaborate rules and mechanisms to protect weaker
parties. Informal systems deemphasize these concerns—they presume “that
the people or entities that interact outside formal legal institutions are
roughly equal in political power, wealth, and social status.”
Id. at 1394 (footnote omitted).
164. Id. at 1400. Delgado observed that prejudice is more likely “when a member of an
in-group confronts a member of an out-group,” or “when a person of low status and power
confronts a person or institution of high status and power.” Id. at 1402.
ADR also poses heightened risks of prejudice when the issue to be adjudicated touches a sensitive or intimate area of life, for example, housing or
culture-based conduct. Thus, many landlord-tenant, interneighbor, and intrafamilial disputes are poor candidates for ADR. When the parties are of
unequal status and the question litigated concerns a sensitive, intimate area,
the risks of an outcome colored by prejudice are especially great.
Id. at 1403 (footnote omitted).
165. Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 4, at 1060; Grillo, supra note 162, at 1549. Trina
Grillo acknowledged that mediation has the potential to be “useful and empowering” if its
inherent risks are addressed rather than ignored. Id. at 1610. Grillo noted that mediation
lacks many protections that are present in formal adjudication. Id. at 1561. A lack of lawyers means that parties lack a protector of their rights and insulation against the other
party. The protections present in formal adjudication especially benefit the party with less
power, often women. Mediation as currently instituted leaves women exposed and vulnerable and is ultimately less beneficial to society’s outsiders than adjudication. Id. at 1610.
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powerful spouses.”166 Grillo ultimately found ADR to be a “fundamentally flawed” alternative to adjudication in certain situations, forcing
those with less power, usually women, “to acquiesce in their own
oppression.”167
Another key critic, Professor Marjorie Silver, broached the shadowy
impact of ADR on civil rights claims.168 Silver noted a lack of empirical
studies to support ADR by federal civil rights enforcement agencies.169
She also highlighted a “lack of empirical study of and theoretical inquiry
into the political dimensions of ADR.”170 Instead, she observed, the salutary spotlight on ADR highlighted its potential for efficiency but left its
politics in the dark.171 ADR also focused too much on individual disputes, precluding agencies from acting upon “patterns and systems of discrimination” and thus disempowering already disadvantaged groups and
preserving the institutional status quo.172 In an overriding effort to save
time and money, “justice, law compliance and relief for civil rights complainants as a group” fell by the wayside.173
C. FIVE YEARS HENCE: WHERE HAVE

THE

CRITICS GONE?

I highlighted these early critiques in my 1996 essay, ADR: Where Have
the Critics Gone?. I noted that ADR presented daunting obstacles for
those on society’s margins. ADR removed disputes from the light of public scrutiny. Deterrence and public education values served by open proceedings were undermined by ADR. The loss of a public forum was
critical for those of lesser societal power. Serious public consideration of
minority perspectives was sacrificed. ADR also transformed public debates about rights and misconduct into secret proceedings.
I noted that these earlier critiques had seemingly disappeared from
mainstream legal discourse and public policymaking.174 I observed that
overriding concerns for efficiency and waning attention to race and gen166. Grillo, supra note 162 at 1610.
167. Id.
168. Silver, supra note 162, at 527–28 (analyzing the effect of ADR on civil rights claims
in terms of expedience, efficiency, cost effectiveness, finality, and enforceability).
169. Id. at 498 (emphasizing the “dearth of empirical evaluation” of dispute resolution,
particularly the use of alternative procedures by government agencies).
170. Id. at 588; Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 4, at 1061.
171. Id. at 543. A General Accounting Office (GAO) report to Congress dispelled the
EEOC’s claim that its ADR settlements were efficient. Although ADR expedited dispute
resolution, it generated “inadequate” settlements “ha[ving] little if any substance.” Id. According to the GAO,
[B]oth employers and charging parties felt they were pressured into settlements that failed to accord justice—employers because they believed they
made concessions in the absence of cognizable wrongdoing; charging parties
because receiving some settlement led them to believe that their charges
must have merit, but that the settlement was inadequate.
Id.
172. Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 4, at 1060 (highlighting Silver’s concern that ADR’s
narrow focus negatively impacts civil rights claimants).
173. Id.; see also Silver, supra note 162, at 540–46.
174. Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 4, at 1062–67.
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der critiques, woven together, created a partially broken mosaic of mainstream ADR proselytizing.175
By weaving these observations with those of early critics of efficiency
reforms, I concluded that the “hastening rush toward ADR” buried critical analysis of “ADR’s actual benefits and hidden disadvantages for the
already disadvantaged”176 and dropped a veil over “ADR’s possible ideological dimensions.”177
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow similarly observed that ADR was
“becoming an institutionalized part of the system it was supposed to
transform.”178 She raised essential, unanswered jurisprudential and policy
questions: “What are the politics of ADR?” “How should we measure the
‘quality’ of justice?”179
Professor Kim Dayton thus called for empirical scrutiny into the impacts of ADR, particularly for those of lesser social or economic
power.180 “Calling ADR’s efficacy a ‘myth,’ Dayton argued that ‘the statistics simply do not support’ the claim that ADR is cost and time efficient.”181 Dayton also called for “more exacting scrutiny . . . to determine
whether ADR is the salvation of federal civil litigation—or if the emperor has no clothes.”182
With these questions and observations in mind, I assessed ADR
through a “critical legal-sociological” lens into political underpinnings
and economic consequences.183 That lens is sharpened by critical procedural inquiry.184 Critical procedure now illuminates ADR and AMEX/
Concepcion’s integral role in the on-going Second Wave.
175. Id. at 1066.
176. Id. at 1062; see Deborah R. Hensler, Does ADR Really Save Money? The Jury’s
Still Out, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 11, 1994, at C2.
177. Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 4, at 1062, 1064 (observing that “the time and costsavings of ADR are evaluated and highlighted while the underlying political impacts and
value choices are downplayed”).
178. Id. at 1061; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 162, at 2. Carrie Menkel-Meadow described the “conflicting impulses and purposes behind the ADR movement” and
mandatory arbitration. Id. By 1991, institutionalization of ADR was already widespread,
permeating both public and private forums for dispute resolution, as well as professional
ADR organizations. Menkel-Meadow expressed concern that ADR, while salutary in some
instances, “does not foster communitarian and self-determination goals.” Id. at 11.
179. Id. at 5.
180. Dayton, supra note 162, at 957. Professor Dayton contrasted the apparent popularity of ADR in 1991 with federal trial judges, attorneys, and litigants with the lack of empirical scrutiny evidencing ADR’s success. Congress “swallowed so completely the myth of
ADR in federal courts” that the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 pushed ADR to reduce
backlog and delay in litigation without clear evidence of ADR’s purported benefits. Id.
Dayton’s own study failed to confirm ADR’s advocates salutary claims. Id.
181. Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 4, at 1061 (quoting Dayton and highlighting Dayton’s study finding a lack of evidence to support ADR’s efficiency).
182. Dayton, supra note 162, at 957; Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 4, at 1061–62.
183. Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 4, at 1056; see Trubek, supra note 107, at 111
(describing a “critical sociology of civil procedure” that examines linkages between language, knowledge, and power and the social effects of dispute resolution process and
procedure).
184. See supra Section II.
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V. AMEX AND CONCEPCION: PRIVATIZING AND
INDIVIDUALIZING DISPUTE RESOLUTION
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant185 and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion186 are the sinecure of the conservative Court
majority’s covert campaign to suppress small- and moderate-sized claims
against large businesses. As central to the Second Wave’s procedural
changes wrought by fiat rather than rulemaking, the ADR rulings in
these cases dramatically constrict court access and claim development for
consumers, employees, small businesses, tenants, and civil rights claimants. Laying a broad foundation for these cases, beginning in 2006, the
Scalia five-member majority “propound[ed] an interpretation of the FAA
and an approach to arbitration that would make arbitration agreements
unescapable and arbitration decisions nearly impermeable to challenge,
even in the face of overwhelming evidence of egregious unfairness, overreaching, or bias.”187 The Court’s AMEX and Concepcion rulings then
shunted small and moderate-sized claimants into arbitration and forced
them to forgo class treatment and litigate individually.188 Especially significant, those rulings compelled claimants to arbitrate separately even
when the high cost of individually arbitrating claims far surpasses potential recovery.189 More “than a decade in the making, the move to block
class actions was engineered by a Wall Street-led coalition of credit card
companies and retailers” and advanced by then private lawyer, and now
chief justice, John Roberts.190
A. THE FOUNDATIONAL CASES
The Supreme Court laid a cornerstone for AMEX three years earlier.191 Stolt–Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. held that
185. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
186. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
187. Katherine V.W. Stone, The Bold Ambition of Justice Scalia’s Arbitration Jurisprudence: Keep Workers and Consumers Out of Court, 21 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 192
(2017).
188. Alison Frankel, What Hope Remains for Consumers, Employees After SCOTUS
Amex Ruling?, REUTERS (June 20, 2013) (“Between them, Concepcion and Amex leave
consumers, employees and small businesses that are subject to class action waivers in
mandatory arbitration provisions without hope of evading the waiver.”).
189. Michael B. Miller & Adam J. Hunt, American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant: The Supreme Court Reaffirms Its Commitment to Enforcing Arbitration Agreements, MORRISON FOERSTER (June 24, 2013), http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/
130624-American-Express-vs-Colors.pdf [https://perma.cc/SQ64-AA24].
190. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 3.
191. In addition to the cases discussed in this section, conservative justices laid other
pieces of the foundation. In Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446
(2006), under the FAA, Justice Scalia for the majority enforced a mandatory arbitration
clause even though state contract law would likely have invalidated the contract as a whole
(deeming the arbitration clause severable). Accord Nitro-Lift Techs, L.L.C. v. Howard, 133
S. Ct. 500, 504 (2012); Marmet Health Care Ctr. V. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533 (2012). In
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010), the Court further narrowed employees’, consumers’ and small businesses’ prospects for challenging a specific arbitration
clause as unconscionable (where the contract as a whole is valid but the unbargained-for
arbitration provision is not). Scalia, for the majority, rejected a court’s power to determine
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absent an express, mutual agreement for class arbitration, neither party
could compel the other to arbitrate as a class.192 The Court declared that
“class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties [particularly corporate defendants] consented to [class arbitration] by simply agreeing to submit
their disputes to an arbitrator.”193 The conservative majority, led by Justice Samuel Alito, disguised the sharp consequences of its ruling behind
neutral contractual language: unless large companies expressly agree to
class arbitration in their contracts with employees/consumers/contractors,
they cannot be so compelled.194
Two years after Stolt–Nielsen, Concepcion laid the next foundational
piece. Vincent and Liza Concepcion purchased a service contract from
AT&T Mobility LLC.195 The contract’s small print required “arbitration
of all disputes” in an “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class
member in any purported class or representative proceeding.”196
The Concepcions sued in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of California, claiming that “AT&T had engaged in
false advertising and fraud by charging [a hidden] sales tax on phones it
advertised as free.”197 The district court consolidated the case with others
and refashioned them as a class action.198 AT&T moved to compel individual claimant arbitrations, asserting that the plaintiffs waived any right
to sue as a class. The plaintiffs responded that the class waiver contract
clause was invalid because they had not bargained over it199 “the arbitrathe validity of the mandatory arbitration clause where the clause itself delegates that determination to the arbitrator—even though the delegation language was an integral part of
the arbitration clause and even though judges are otherwise to determine the validity and
applicability of the arbitration clause. After Rent-A-Center, large businesses could avoid
court determinations of unconscionability of arbitration clauses (including class waivers)
simply by including a phrase in the clause delegating those determinations to the arbitrators (most of whom are selected by the businesses). See also CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012) (holding that the FAA overrides an on-point federal statute
creating a consumers’ right to sue credit organizations and therefore dismissing a statutorybased consumer class action against a financial services company for fraudulent misrepresentations). Professor Stone characterizes the Scalia majority’s decisions in these and other
related cases as having built an “edifice of arbitration law that effectively walls off the
federal courts from most lawsuits brought by ordinary individuals . . . [relegating consumers and worker’s claims] to the privatized, invisible, and unaccountable forum of arbitration.” Stone, supra note 187, at 192.
192. 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010).
193. Id. at 685.
194. See id. 684, 687 (declaring that since Stolt-Nielsen did not agree to class arbitration
it could not be compelled to class arbitrate).
195. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337 (2011).
196. Id. at 336.
197. Id. at 337.
198. Id.
199. In 2008 the United States District Court for the Southern District of California in
Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11,
2008), under state law, nullified unbargained-for arbitration agreements as substantively
unconscionable “because the class arbitration waiver allowed the corporation to avoid responsibility for wrongful behavior that the consumers would have addressed through class
arbitration, but did not have an incentive to address through individual arbitration.“ Jeremy McManus, A Motion to Compel Changes to Federal Arbitration Law: How to Remedy
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tion agreement was unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory under
California law because it disallowed classwide procedures.”200 California
law—the Discover Bank rule—invalidated class action waivers that exempted the party with “superior bargaining power . . . from responsibility
for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of
another.”201
The Supreme Court addressed whether the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) prohibited state courts from refusing to enforce class arbitration
waivers in light of state no-class waiver laws.202 The conservative five-tofour majority, led by Justice Scalia,203 held that the FAA preempted the
state law ban on class action waivers in consumer contracts.204 California’s Discover Bank rule,205 he wrote, employing neutral language of effithe Abuses Consumers Face When Arbitrating Disputes, 37 B.C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 177, 200
(2017).
200. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 337–38. After the conservative majority’s series of byzantine rulings on state law unconscionability, three pitfalls threaten unconscionability challenges in federal court.
First, unconscionability arguments must be directed solely at the arbitration
provision, and not the contract as a whole. A challenge that seeks to invalidate the contract as a whole (other than [its initial formation]) must be decided by the arbitrator; a challenge that seeks to invalidate only the
arbitration clause is decided by the court. Second, . . . if the arbitration
clause contains a delegation provision saying the arbitrator will decide the
validity of the arbitration clause, any challenge must be directed to the delegation provision itself [whether delegation to the arbitrator was proper] . . .
Unless that delegation provision is invalid, the arbitrator will decide the rest.
Finally, because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Concepcion, arbitration
clauses usually cannot be held unconscionable because they eliminate class
actions, although the enforceability of the waiver may be undermined by applicable state law.
Karla Gilbride & Arthur H. Bryant, Loosen the Bonds, 40 L.A. LAWYER 22, 26 (2017)
(footnotes omitted).
201. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d
1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (citing Cal. Civ. Code Ann. §1668)). The Discover Bank rule assesses three factors in determining whether a class action waiver in a consumer contract is
unconscionable:
(1) Whether the agreement was a contract of adhesion, (2) whether the dispute was likely to involve small amounts of damages, and (3) whether the
party with superior bargaining power carried out a scheme to deliberately
charge large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.
Stone, supra note 187, at 192.
202. Id. at 341–52.
203. Jeffrey Toobin, Looking Back, THE NEW YORKER (February 29, 2016), http://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/02/29/antonin-scalia-looking-backward [https://perma.cc/
QFH9-5PEL] (“Antonin Scalia . . . devoted his professional life to making the United
States a less fair, less tolerant, and less admirable democracy.”).
204. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.
205. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2016); Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No.
05CV1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008) (characterizing the Discover
Bank rule’s “[f]aithful adherence to California’s stated policy of favoring class litigation
and [class] arbitration to deter alleged fraudulent conduct in cases involving large numbers
of consumers with small amounts of damages”); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d
1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005) (highlighting that the Discover Bank rule, on unconscionability
grounds, prohibits enforcement of a class action waiver when the waiver is in a “take it or
leave it” consumer contract, the waiver involves a dispute with a predictably small amount
of damages, and it is alleged that the party with superior bargaining power engaged in a
scheme to deliberately cheat consumers).
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ciency, “st[ood] as an obstacle to . . . the FAA’s objectives” of
“enforcement of private [arbitration] agreements and encouragement of
efficient and speedy dispute resolution.”206
Despite the gross disparity in bargaining power, the majority ruled that
the FAA—applicable when the underlying contract involves interstate
commerce207—commands enforcement of private arbitration and class
waiver contract clauses.208 Employing neutered language about “efficient
and speedy dispute resolution,”209 the majority blandly reasoned that
“[t]he ‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.’”210
Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent countered by focusing on the non-neutral group-disempowering impacts of the majority’s preemption ruling.
Breyer maintained that in order to “implement Congress’ intent, [the
Court] should think more than twice before invalidating a state law that
does just what § 2 [of the FAA] requires, namely, put[ ] agreements to
arbitrate and agreements to litigate ‘upon the same footing.’”211 Breyer
noted that the California Supreme Court had the “perfectly rational
view” that “nonclass arbitration over such [small] sums will . . . sometimes
have the effect of depriving claimants of their claims” and “insulate an
agreement’s author from liability for its own frauds.”212 Breyer called for
the federal courts to allow state laws to block the enforcement of arbitration clauses in near-adhesion contracts where enforcement effectively
bars the adjudication of meritorious claims and inoculates businesses
against liability for their wrongdoing.
Following Concepcion, small claimants faced a substantial hurdle. Boilerplate class action waivers buried in arbitration clauses in a multitude of
business-drafted agreements involving interstate commerce would be enforced by federal courts regardless of state laws invalidating arbitration
class waivers.213 After Concepcion, businesses regularly incorporated
206. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343, 345; cf. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,
872 (2000); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000).
207. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1 (defining commerce to include “commerce
among the several states”) and §2 (requiring “a transaction involving commerce”) (West
2017). See Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003) (“the FAA encompasses
a wider range of transactions than those actually “in commerce”a—that is, ‘within the flow
of interstate commerce’”).
208. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352.
209. Id. at 345 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)).
210. Id. at 344 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
211. Id. at 362 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2016)).
212. Id. at 365–66 (citing Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1100).
213. See Jonathan Gertler & Christian Schreiber, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion: The
Death Knell for Class Actions?, PLAINTIFF MAGAZINE, June 2011, at 3–4. Despite its professed fealty to the express terms of arbitration clauses, reflected in Concepcion, the Court
refused to enforce an explicit arbitration clause invalidating an entire arbitration provision
“if the law of your state makes the waiver of class arbitration unenforceable.” In
DIRECTV v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015), the Court declined to enforce the specific
terms of the arbitration agreement, relying on Concepcion to find the state law preempted.
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg described the import of the majority’s ruling.
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class waivers into the small-print arbitration clauses in standard form
contracts.214
Stolt–Nielsen and Concepcion closed the door to class action lawsuits
and class arbitration, but with one remaining opening—the effective vindication exception.215 Prior to AMEX, this court-recognized exception
offered a possible escape route for small-to-moderate-sized claimants
seeking to publicly hold large corporate defendants liable for substantive
law violations. The escape, by design, “prevent[s] arbitration clauses from
choking off a plaintiff’s ability to enforce congressionally created [legal]
rights.”216
The Court first recognized the effective vindication exception in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.217 The exception
applies if arbitral proceedings “will be so gravely difficult . . . that [the
claimant] will for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in
court.”218 The effective vindication exception applies not only to “baldly
exculpatory [provisions or] prohibitive fees,” but also to “the world of
other provisions a clever drafter might devise to scuttle even the most
meritorious federal claims.”219
B.

AMEX—THE SCALIA MAJORITY

AMEX addressed the viability of the effective vindication exception,
specifically, whether the FAA permits courts to invalidate a contractual
class arbitration waiver where a plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating
a federal claim far exceeds its potential recovery.220 Justice Scalia, writing
for the Court’s conservative majority, said no.221
Plaintiff Italian Colors Restaurant initiated a class action on behalf of
Today, the Court holds that consumers lack not only protection against unambiguous class-arbitration bans in adhesion contracts. They lack even the
benefit of the doubt when anomalous terms in such contracts reasonably
could be construed to protect their rights.
Id. at 476 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
214. J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124
YALE L.J. 3052, 3082 n.126 (2015) (citing Justice Goodwin Liu of the California Supreme
Court for his pushback against the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent arbitration cases).
215. Okezie Chukwumerije, The Evolution and Decline of the Effective-Vindication
Doctrine in U.S. Arbitration Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375, 377 (2014) (characterizing the effective vindication exception as conceived to ensure that arbitration is an effective mechanism for vindicating federal statutory rights and concluding that the exception
plays a crucial role in promoting access to justice for small claimants against large corporate defendants).
216. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
217. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
218. Id. at 632.
219. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2317.
220. See id. at 2307.
221. Id. at 2312; see David Garcia & Leo Caseria, Opinion Analysis: A Class Action
Waiver in an Arbitration Agreement Will Be Strictly Enforced Under the Federal Arbitration
Act, SCOTUSBLOG (June 21, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/opinion-analysis-a-class-action-waiver-in-an-arbitration-agreement-will-be-strictly-enforcedunder-the-federal-arbitration-act/ [https://perma.cc/AF5W-UBG9].
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small business merchants accepting American Express charge cards.222
American Express required the merchants to sign its unilaterally drafted
commercial contract. That contract included a small-print clause requiring individual arbitration of all disputes.223 Italian Colors initiated an antitrust class action, claiming that American Express deployed its
monopoly power to force merchants to accept charge cards at rates thirty
percent higher than competitors.224
American Express moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the class
litigation.225 Italian Colors and the other merchants resisted. They argued
that the exorbitant cost of individual arbitrations prevented “[effective]
vindication of [their] meritorious federal claims.”226 The merchants’ expert presented conclusive evidence that the claimants could only prove
their antitrust claims through a $200,000-plus economic study that defines
relevant markets, establishes American Express’s monopoly power, and
shows anti-competitive effects.227 The study was inordinately expensive
for an individual claimant in light of the approximate $30,000 ceiling for
the individual’s recovery.228 To afford to pursue their identical claims, numerous small businesses would need to join in one action and share costs.
The district court granted American Express’s motion to compel individual private arbitration and dismissed the suit.229 But, the Second Cir222. Am. Express, 133 S.Ct. at 2308.
223. The arbitration provision of the Card Acceptance Agreement read, in relevant
part:
If arbitration is chosen by any party with respect to a claim, neither you nor
we will have the right to litigate that claim in court or have a jury trial on that
claim. . . . Further, you will not have the right to participate in a representative capacity or as a member of any class of claimants pertaining to any claim
subject to arbitration. The arbitrator’s decision will be final and binding.
Note that other rights that you would have if you went to court may also not
be available in arbitration.
There shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class
action basis or on any basis involving Claims brought in a purported representative capacity on behalf of the general public, other establishments which
accept the Card . . . or other persons or entities similarly situated. Furthermore, Claims brought by or against a Service Establishment may not be
joined or consolidated in the arbitration with Claims brought by or against
any other Service Establishment(s), unless otherwise agreed to in writing by
all parties.
In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 306–07 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Am. Express,
133 S.Ct at 2308.
224. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2308; Class Actions—Class Arbitration Waivers—American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 127 HARV. L. REV. 278, 287 (2013) (describing the Supreme Court’s message that “absent a clear textual signal from Congress, class
waivers are enforceable even if plaintiffs’ federal statutory claims are too expensive to
bring individually”).
225. In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., No. 03 CV 9592 (GBD), 2006 WL 662341, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2006).
226. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting)
227. See id. at 2308 (majority opinion) (detailing prohibitive costs that would prevent
plaintiffs from individually pursuing their claims).
228. See id. at 2308 (highlighting individual arbitration’s exorbitant cost and minimal
recovery that would leave even a successful claimant hundreds of thousands of dollars in
the hole).
229. In re Am. Express, 2006 WL 662341, at *10.
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cuit held the litigation waiver unenforceable because the merchants
“would incur prohibitive costs if compelled to [individually] arbitrate
under the class action waiver.”230 In support, the court relied upon the
effective vindication exception to compelled class waivers in Green Tree
Financial Corp. Alabama v. Randolph.231 In Randolph, the Supreme
Court determined that the effective vindication exception was vital to the
overall claim resolution process—it invalidated arbitration provisions
that precluded plaintiffs from vindicating modest value claims because of
prohibitive individual arbitration costs.232
Indeed, Randolph, following Mitsubishi,233 clarified the effective vindication exception’s application. If the plaintiff presented clear evidence
that prohibitive individual arbitration costs would preclude pursuit of an
apparently meritorious claim, the court would invalidate the arbitration
class waiver provision.234 The plaintiff in Randolph failed to meet this
burden, and the Supreme Court approved individual arbitration.235 Especially significant, the Court in Randolph reaffirmed the judiciary’s duty to
invalidate arbitration class waiver provisions where prohibitive costs are
demonstrated.236
Justice Scalia, for the AMEX majority, rejected Randolph’s continuing
embrace of the effective vindication exception. He deemed the exception
inapplicable despite Italian Colors’ convincing showing that exceedingly
high individual arbitration costs would prevent continued pursuit of its
federal claims.237
Justice Scalia’s initial thrust against the effective vindication doctrine
was to characterize it as Mitsubishi dicta. He declared that Mitsubishi did
not rely upon the exception, and thus it could not be considered controlling law.238 But, as Justice Kagan aptly observed in refuting his declaration, Scalia labeled the exception dicta while having “precious little to say
about why.”239 Scalia then turned to asserting that if the effective vindication exception were “law,” it would bar only facially explicit “prospective
waiver[s] of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies.”240 The exception would only invalidate arbitral provisions that expressly foreclosed
plaintiffs’ statutory rights. But no such contract provisions exist. By limiting the exception to nonexistent circumstances, Scalia achieved the conservative majority’s readily apparent objective: eliminating “prohibitive
230. In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 315–16 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding the
exception satisfied).
231. Id.; Green Tree Financial Corp.–Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
232. See Randolph, 531 U.S. at 91–92.
233. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
234. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 92.
235. Id. at 91–92.
236. See id. at 80–81.
237. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
238. Id.; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 640.
239. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
240. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19 (emphasis added)).
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costs” as a trigger for the exception. Employing pure formalist language,
Scalia concluded that the “fact that it is not worth the expense involved in
proving a statutory remedy [would] not constitute the elimination of the
right to pursue that remedy.”241
Justice Scalia also characterized Concepcion as the precedential deathblow to the effective vindication exception: “[t]ruth to tell, our decision in
[Concepcion] all but resolves” AMEX.242 But Scalia’s terse one-paragraph discussion of Concepcion, referencing the “procedural morass” that
accompanies class arbitration, failed to show how.243 Relying upon the
ostensibly neutral principle of procedural efficiency as his trump card,
Scalia simply asserted that “[Concepcion] established . . . that the FAA’s
command to enforce arbitration agreements [in the name of efficiency]
trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims.”244
Concepcion, however, did not address the effective vindication exception
at all. As Justice Kagan pointed out, Justice Scalia wrongly relied upon
Concepcion as his precedential coup de grâce.
After three tenuous arguments for undercutting the effective vindication exception, Justice Scalia turned to broad Second Wave efficiency reform rhetoric. He contended that the Second Circuit’s regime in AMEX
for invalidating arbitration class action waivers would necessitate an administrative superstructure, and this bulky apparatus would run counter
to arbitration’s efficiency rationale.245 Unless substantially narrowed,
Scalia maintained, the effective vindication exception superstructure
would force courts and parties to constantly litigate predicted arbitration
costs versus potential recovery in order to determine the exception’s applicability.246 This motion-to-compel-arbitration superstructure “would
undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that arbitration in
general . . . was meant to secure.”247 The judicial interest in “streamlined
proceedings”—a sweeping, all-encompassing resort to efficiency—justified writing the effective vindication exception practically out of
existence.248
At bottom, the conservative majority’s ruling cut the legs off the effective vindication exception.249 It sent a message loud and clear: No escape—no class actions, no class arbitration.250
But, ensconced behind the veil of efficiency, Scalia left much unsaid.
Justice Elena Kagan’s stinging dissent identified what was really going
241. Id. at 2311.
242. Id. at 2312.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2312 n.5.
245. Id. at 2312.
246. Garcia & Caseria, supra note 221.
247. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2312 (construing the FAA as disproving such a judicially-created superstructure); see Garcia & Caseria, supra note 221.
248. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011); Glover, supra note
214, at 3063–64.
249. Garcia & Caseria, supra note 221.
250. See id.
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on—ideological preferences for some over others, big over small, businesses over people.
C. KAGAN DISSECTS SCALIA: “DO

NOT

BE FOOLED”

Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer joined Justice Kagan251 in exposing how the AMEX majority undermined the rule of law
through its ideologically-driven elimination of the effective vindication
exception.252 The majority ruling was not actually about precedent, she
maintained. Nor was it really about efficiency. Kagan emphasized that the
conservative majority’s ostensibly procedural ruling revealed a clear substantive preference: de facto legal immunity for large businesses by
preventing small and moderately sized claimants from effectively vindicating meritorious claims publicly through class actions.253 And Kagan
aptly characterized Justice Scalia’s reaction to AMEX’s deleterious impact on those possessing “low value claims” as “[t]oo darn bad.”254 The
conservative majority disguised its ideological preferences though neutral
language of procedural efficiency. Kagan warned: “Do not be fooled.”255
1. “Giving the Monopolist Power to Deprive Its Victims of All Legal
Recourse”
Mitsubishi and Randolph are precedent, not dicta. More specifically,
Justice Kagan rebuked the AMEX majority’s “betrayal of our precedents”—Mitsubishi and Randolph.256 The effective vindication exception,
she showed, is a settled doctrine integral to the entire federal arbitration
scheme. It is not mere dicta as Justice Scalia contended. Mitsubishi recognized that “federal statutory claims are subject to arbitration so long as
the claimant may effectively vindicate [its] rights in [an] arbitral forum.”257 It thereby barred judicial enforcement of mandatory arbitration
that would effectively “confer immunity from potentially meritorious federal claims.”258 Mitsubishi recognized the exception as an integral pillar
251. See id. (“Justice Sotomayor recus[ed] herself because she sat on the Second Circuit
panel that originally decided the case.”).
252. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
253. For subsequent cases exemplifying AMEX/Concepcion’s de facto immunity for
large businesses by preventing small and moderately sized claimants from vindicating their
claims through class actions, see, for example, Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp.,
773 F.3d 488, 494–95 (3d Cir. 2014); Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 293
(2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 744 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir.
2013); Ferguson v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 2013).
254. See Am. Express Co. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (observing that AMEX bars
not just class actions but also other forms of claimants’ cost sharing).
255. See id. at 2320.
256. See id. at 2313, 2314–15 (describing how the effective vindication emerged as a
core part of the arbitration scheme recognized in Mitsubishi and reinforced in Randolph.);
Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 80–81 (2000); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).
257. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2310 n.2 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636).
258. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the effective vindication exception
“doubtless covers the baldly exculpatory clause . . . that . . . would preclude an arbitration
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of the arbitration edifice.259 And Kagan observed, “we have repeated[ly]
. . . instruct[ed] courts not to enforce an arbitration agreement that effectively (even if not explicitly) foreclose[d] a plaintiff” from vindicating a
federal claim.260 Moreover, Randolph established a clear standard for
triggering the established effective vindication exception—when a claimant demonstrated “prohibitive costs.”261 Justice Kagan thus declared,
“whatever else the majority might think of the effective-vindication rule,
it [did not originate in] dictum.”262
Justice Kagan also shredded Justice Scalia’s assertion that the exception was ambiguous because no clear case example existed to guide its
application.263 She admonished the majority for intentionally ignoring
Randolph, which “fits this case hand in glove.”264 Randolph acknowledged that “forcing a[n individual] plaintiff to bear the brunt of ‘hefty’
arbitration costs and ‘steep filing fees’” would trigger the exception.265
And, Kagan wrote, Randolph’s delineation of the exception expressly encompassed any situation where a contract bars cost-sharing and arbitration costs effectively bar individual pursuit of federal claims.266
Justice Kagan then linked Randolph to AMEX. “Italian Colors proved
what the plaintiff in Randolph could not: the individual arbitration of
each claim would be prohibitively expensive.”267 Italian Colors thus established that the contract “‘operate[d] . . . as a prospective waiver’ and
prevent[ed] the effective vindication” of its federal claims.268
For Justices Kagan, Breyer, and Ginsburg, the conservative majority in
AMEX, under the guise of ADR efficiency, eviscerated the effective vindication exception to give the “monopolist . . . power to insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse.”269 Justice
agreement’s enforcement. But so too it covers the world of other provisions a clever
drafter might devise to scuttle even the most meritorious federal claims.” (Id. at 2317.)).
259. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19 (concluding that if an arbitration agreement
operates as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue a statutory remedy, the Court
would condemn the agreement as against public policy).
260. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
261. Randolph, 531 U.S. at 91–92.
262. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
263. Chukwumerije, supra note 215, at 437–38 (characterizing Scalia’s gambit of calling
the effective vindication exception “unclear” in order to significantly narrow it while ignoring the Court decisions reaffirming the exception and clarifying its application).
264. Am. Express,133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
265. Chukwumerije, supra note 215, at 399 (addressing Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v.
Randolph, 178 F.3d 1149, 1157 (11th Cir. 1999)).
266. See id. at 403–04.
267. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see Green Tree Fin.
Corp.–Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (where “a party seeks to invalidate an
arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive,
that party bears the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs”).
268. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
269. Id. at 2313–14 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (using “monopolist,” without further elaboration, to refer to American Express and other economically-powerful businesses similarly
situated).
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Kagan warned of the majority’s misleading procedural rhetoric.270 Judge
by the consequences: what groups are disempowered, what groups
benefit.
2. “Diminishing the Usefulness of Rule 23 Class Actions”
Concepcion is irrelevant to the effective vindication rule—much less the
“deathblow.” Justice Kagan rejected Justice Scalia’s pithy reliance on
Concepcion, clarifying that Concepcion does not resolve this case.271 The
conservative majority, she declared, in distorting past cases, is surreptitiously “bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23” for small claimant
class actions.272
Concepcion nowhere cited the effective vindication exception to class
waivers.273 According to Justice Kagan, Justice Scalia badly overreached
in his deathblow reliance on Concepcion. Concepcion “involved a state
law, and therefore could not possibly implicate the [federal] effective-vindication rule.”274 Kagan also admonished the majority for narrowly limiting the effective vindication rule to “baldly exculpatory provisions.”275
Doing so would allow major companies to always avoid the exception—
businesses crafting arbitration clauses would simply avoid express language conferring substantive law immunity.276
For the dissenting justices, what was really going on was this: conservative antipathy toward class adjudication. The Scalia majority deployed
procedure covertly to eliminate the substantive impacts of class litigation
because collective actions at times are the only vehicle for holding large
companies, like American Express, legally liable and publicly accountable for widespread, moderate value law violations.277 A scholar and selfproclaimed “one of [Scalia’s] biggest fans,” even observes:
for better or for worse . . . [no] other Justice of the Supreme Court in
American history has done more to hinder the class action lawsuit
than Justice Scalia did. The Justice did his damage not so much in his
opinions interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . but in
his opinions interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act . . . giving a
green light to corporations that want to opt out of class-wide liability
entirely so long as they do so using arbitration contracts.278
270. Id. at 2320.
271. Id. at 2319–20.
272. Id. at 2320 (highlighting that the Court is “bent on diminishing the usefulness of
Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled”).
273. Id. (highlighting that Concepcion did not cite or discuss the primary effective vindication exception cases—Mitsubishi and Randolph).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 2314.
276. Class Actions, supra note 224, at 282.
277. See id.
278. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Justice Scalia and Class Actions: A Loving Critique, 92 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1977, 1977 (2017).
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3. “A Foolproof Way of Killing Off Valid Claims”
The effective vindication exception promotes the FAA’s goal of efficiency. Finally, Justice Kagan pointed out that Justice Scalia quibbled
about inefficiencies generated by Concepcion’s no-class-waiver state law.
That ban, Scalia opined, “mitigated arbitration’s primary advantage—’its
informality’—by making the process ‘slower, more costly, and more likely
to generate procedural morass than final judgment.’”279 Justice Kagan
rooted her rejoinder in legal process reality. “The effective-vindication
rule furthers the [FAA]’s goals by ensuring that arbitration remains a
real, not faux, method of dispute resolution.”280 It encourages large corporations to adopt arbitration procedures that streamline actual complaint resolution.281 And it “promotes the most fundamental purposes of
the FAA itself”282: “actual arbitration—that is, arbitration as a streamlined ‘method of resolving disputes,’ not as a foolproof way of killing off
valid claims.”283 The majority, she observed, instead of streamlining reallife dispute resolution, was formalistically morphing compelled arbitration into “a mechanism [more] easily made to block the vindication of
meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability.”284
VI. CRITICAL CONSEQUENCES
Early ADR critics, myself included, worried about the unstated politics
of ADR and its “hidden disadvantages for the already disadvantaged.”285
Amid the First Wave of efficiency procedural reforms, we worried about
the “‘quality’ of justice” for outsiders over time and whether arbitration,
in particular, might prove less the “salvation of federal . . . litigation” and
more—at least in some situations—a case of the “emperor ha[ving] no
clothes.”286
The Supreme Court’s Second Wave AMEX/Concepcion rulings significantly deepen those concerns. They extend ADR’s deleterious impacts
well beyond the cautionary scenarios imagined by the early outsider critiques. Critical procedure underscores the significance. Its attention to the
power of procedure to generate differential impacts and reflect ideological preferences—all under the guise of ostensibly neutral efficiency reforms—reveals how and possibly why a conservative Court majority
deployed compelled arbitration to privatize and individualize a wide
swath of claims against major businesses and institutions. As Justice Ka279. Id. at 281 (citing Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2312).
280. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 2313 (majority opinion).
283. Id. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)).
284. Id. at 2320.
285. See Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 4, at 1062; supra Section IV.C. and text accompanying note 177.
286. Yamamoto, ADR, supra note 4, at 1061–62 (quoting Dayton, supra note 162, at
957).

806

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

gan’s AMEX dissent intimates, and as critical procedure inquiry illuminates, AMEX and Concepcion are key drivers of the Second Wave’s
constriction of court access and claim development—a designed narrowing of the legal process by judicial fiat.
Assessed through a critical procedure lens, the consequences are
profound. At bottom, the rulings force many small-to-moderate-sized
claimants—often those of limited social or economic power—to abandon
meritorious claims. They abandon those claims because of the AMEX/
Concepcion triple whammy: those claimants are compelled to waive public litigation in favor of private arbitration; are compelled to waive class
treatment and litigate individually once in arbitration; and are no longer
allowed to avail themselves of the “effective vindication exception” even
if individual arbitration costs far exceed potential recovery.287 This claim
suppression flows from Justice Scalia and the conservative majority’s “jiggery-pokery” in favor of big business.288
A.

JIGGERY-POKERY—HIDING IDEOLOGY BEHIND
OF PROCEDURAL NEUTRALITY

THE

VEIL

Professor David S. Schwartz takes Justice Scalia to task for “jiggerypokery”—a phrase Scalia coined289 to characterize justices’ employment
of slithery language to hide what is really going on. Schwartz turns
Scalia’s phrase back on him, skewering Scalia for his “penchant for criticizing his colleagues for judicial practices in which he frequently indulged
himself.”290 Schwartz highlights Scalia’s jiggery-pokery in AMEX and
Concepcion.291
Justice Scalia deceptively advanced the conservative majority’s substantive value choice of protecting large business defendants292—even at
the expense of subverting meritorious claims of those of lesser power,
even if doing so entailed five justices by fiat rewriting settled procedural
law. Scalia, an express advocate for judicial restraint, did so through misdirection, employing the language of efficiency to disguise actual value
preferences.293 Schwartz concluded, “one can hope that Justice Scalia’s
doctrinal jiggery-pokery in federal arbitration law will soon be overruled,
287. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing how the majority ruling, in practice, forces a small business claimant to choose between spending exorbitantly more to arbitrate than its claim is worth, or relinquishing a potentially meritorious
substantive federal claim).
288. Glover, supra note 214, at 3092 (examining the effects of enabling large businesses
to achieve a hassle-free reduction of legal liability by enlisting the courts to enforce
mandatory individual arbitrations provisions in contracts that consumers have no choice
but to sign to obtain a credit card, or cell phone, or other products).
289. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2500 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the
“Court’s next bit of interpretive jiggery-pokery”).
290. David S. Schwartz, Justice Scalia’s Jiggery-Pokery in Federal Arbitration Law, 101
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 75, 75 (2016).
291. See id.
292. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2320; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333,
352 (2011).
293. See supra Section V.B.1.

2017]

Critical Procedure

807

gone and forgotten.”294
B. COMPELLED PRIVATIZED ARBITRATION—SUBVERTING “COURTS
AND THE CULTURAL PERFORMANCE”
After Concepcion the effective vindication doctrine remained the sole
day-in-court lifeline for small-to-moderate-sized claimants seeking to reject boilerplate small-print arbitration clauses in employment, leasing,
product supply, retail sales, and financial transactions.295 But then
AMEX terminated that lifeline, practically narrowing the doctrine out of
existence.296 A wide array of claims has now vanished from the public
adjudication arena—and, indeed, from any arena. As Professor Myriam
Gilles observes, this shift from public litigation to private arbitration
“amounts to [a] whole-scale privatization of the justice system.”297 And
because the Scalia majority invoked the ostensibly neutral principle of
efficiency, “[t]he change has been swift and virtually unnoticed . . . [and]
Americans [are actively being deprived of their] fundamental right: their
day in court.”298 Jiggery-pokery in action.
Critical procedure underscores this loss. As developed in Section III,
courts in controversial cases serve as sites of cultural performances.
Pleadings, full discovery (with subpoena power), temporary restraining
orders, motions, and public trials offer claimants of lesser power a structured decisional forum where the more powerful are obliged to disclose
and participate—even against their will—in a dynamic ritual of public
accounting. Those claimants, with attendant media reportage, are empowered to organize collective voices and publically advance narratives
that generate new understandings of wrongful behavior—for instance,
the widespread injustice of a multi-store business’ discriminatory treatment of women and immigrants.299
By design, compelled arbitration erases it all. The arbitral regime expanded by the conservative majority, with no collective actions, means
limited informational discovery and dissemination; frequent, stark litigation resource imbalances; isolated claimant voices; publicly unaccountable decisionmakers; and limited media scrutiny and real-time social
commentary. AMEX/Concepcion thus tears asunder a fundamental attribute of legal dispute resolution—“courts and the cultural perform294. See Schwartz, supra note 290, at 93.
295. Garcia & Caseria, supra note 221.
296. See Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2316, 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (observing that
AMEX bars not only class actions but also other forms of claimants’ cost sharing).
297. Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 2 (quoting Myriam Gilles).
298. Id.; Lauren Guth Barnes, How Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Waivers Undermine Consumer Rights and Why We Need Congress to Act, 9 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 329, 329–30 (2015); see also Am. Express, 133 S.Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (predicting that large businesses like AMEX will continue to “use [their] monopoly power to insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse”);
Glover, supra note 214, at 3092 (concluding that small claimants who sign waivers of class
and public litigation often lack the option to reject those contractual waivers).
299. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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ance”—undermining the public educational aspects of adjudication and
diminishing opportunities for groups of lesser power to coalesce around
common claims and collectively advocate.300
For this and related reasons, several state Attorneys General joined to
protest the expansive mandatory privatization of dispute resolution. In a
2014 letter to the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
they declared that the Supreme Court badly erred in its recent arbitration
rulings.301 The FAA, they wrote, “was intended to facilitate . . . disputes
between commercial entities of similar situation and bargaining
power,”302 not to enable large businesses to force individually powerless
people unknowingly to waive their rights to public adjudication. Courts
now routinely compel private dispute resolution, the Attorneys General
observed, “even if [the consumer] . . . had no opportunity to negotiate or
reject” the provision because he or she was simply unaware the provision
was buried in the terms of the contract.303
Professor Judith Resnik304 views this burgeoning privatization of dispute resolution as undercutting a traditional adjudication value: an open
process that places on the public stage the defendant’s accountability
under the law.305 Resnik observes that alternative dispute resolution, especially arbitration, occurs “outside the public purview and it displaces
[the importance of a fair] public adjudication.”306 A primary ADR incentive for many defendants, her research shows, is to ensure secrecy.307 But
secrecy, or confidentiality, frustrates the public’s need to know and deprives claimants of the public “benefits of precedential decisionmaking.”308
Professor J. Maria Glover309 extends this criticism of the privatized ar300. Resnik, supra note 139, at 1642.
301. State Attorneys General, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Mandatory Arbitration Provisions in Long-Term Care Facility Contracts Under the Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities (Oct. 30, 2016), https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/
PressRelease/PDF/LTCArbitrationComments.pdf [https://perma.cc/BGJ8-LNPP] [hereinafter “Comments of the State Attorneys”].
302. Id.; see Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (West 2017); Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333, 362 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (Congress intended that “arbitration would
be used primarily . . . where the parties possessed roughly equivalent bargaining power”).
303. Comments of the State Attorneys, supra note 301; see, e.g., Nino v. Jewelry Exch.,
Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 201 (3d Cir. 2010) (“We have consistently found that adhesion contracts—that is, contracts prepared by the party with greater bargaining power and
presented to the other party ‘for signature on a take-it-or-leave-it basis’—satisfy the procedural element of the unconscionability analysis.” (citation omitted)).
304. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2804 (2015); Resnik, supra
note 139, at 1631; Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1793 (2014).
305. See Resnik, supra note 139, at 1634.
306. Id. at 1636.
307. Id. at 1635–36.
308. Glover, supra note 214, at 3055.
309. Id. at 3052; J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012); J. Maria Glover, Beyond
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bitral regime. It deprives less powerful claimants of the opportunity to
publicly appeal arbitrary, secretly-rendered decisions by unaccountable
arbitral panels often repeatedly selected by the businesses crafting the
mandatory arbitration provisions.310 For Glover, like Resnik,311 the
Court’s marked expansion of mandatory ADR—with huge differential
impacts for haves and have nots—taints the rule of law.312 If sunshine
serves as a disinfectant for corporate misfeasance, then shrouding the entire claim assertion and adjudication process allows infections to fester
and spread.313
C. COMPELLED INDIVIDUALIZED ARBITRATION—BLOCKING
COLLECTIVE EMPOWERMENT
A person or small business signing a contract with an AMEX/Concepcion class-waiver arbitration clause is now bound to arbitrate individually314—even if numerous others identically situated are prepared to
assert identical claims against the same company.315 The Court’s conservative five-member majority eliminated both class action suits and
claimant joinder in arbitration. As Justice Kagan observed, AMEX/Concepcion blocks all forms of aggregation,316 quietly but significantly eliminating what the conservative majority perceives as the “dreadful scourge”
of class adjudication against businesses.317
Consistent with critical procedure’s insight into the power of procedure, Terisa Chaw characterizes AMEX/Concepcion as insidious because
it disempowers those who challenge broad scale wrongdoing.318 Female
employees, for instance, are forced to waive class action litigation and to
Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND.
L. REV. 1735 (2006).
310. Glover, supra note 214, at 3062–63.
311. Resnik, supra note 139, at 1687.
312. Glover, supra note 214, at 3082; Resnik, supra note 139, at 1654 (the facial illegitimacy of the judicial system has been furthered by “courts[‘] . . . promulgat[ion of] hundreds
of rules governing various forms of ADR,” particularly arbitration).
313. See id. at 3076–77 (noting that there are two principles that AMEX dramatically
undercuts: “one, that the reworking of substantive law should be achieved by publicly accountable bodies, and two, that . . . public scrutiny should accompany attempts to effectuate changes in substantive legal obligations” that large businesses have).
314. Id. at 3082.
315. See Garcia & Caseria, supra note 221; see also Terisa E. Chaw, Exec. Dir. of the
Nat’l Emp’t Lawyers Ass’n, Statement Made in Response to American Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Restaurant (June 20, 2013) (transcript available at U.S. Supreme Court Decision Will Embolden Companies to Flout Workplace Laws—Congress Must Act, NELA
(June 20, 2013), https://www.nela.org/index.cfm?pg=20130620AMEX [https://perma.cc/
CBH3-9ES4] (observing that the AMEX case “eliminate[s] the ability of small businesses
to join together to vindicate their statutory rights under antitrust laws in arbitration”).
316. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
317. YEAZELL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 90, at 861 (describing “major businesses
and . . . institutions’” view of class actions as a “dreadful scourge, forcing them to settle
even unjustified suits”).
318. See Chaw, supra note 315 (warning that “[f]orced arbitration is anathema to our
public justice system and . . . [large] companies [use forced arbitration] to trump substantive legal rights,” thereby “insulat[ing] wrongdoers from liability”).
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arbitrate their discrimination claims individually. They are barred from
joining their claims in both litigation and arbitration.319 The empowering
opportunity to coalesce and show pervasive group-based discrimination is
lost.320 For employment lawyer Chaw, AMEX/Concepcion drastically alters the collective action landscape, disempowering claimants by fracturing the bonds of joint action in challenging employer misfeasance.321
Porreca v. Rose Group322 exemplifies lower courts’ struggles with these
“unjust” consequences.323 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania compelled individual arbitration in employment disputes
between restaurant employees and their Rose Group employer—claimants were barred from jointly arbitrating claims.324 The court recognized
the “increasing frequency [in the business community] with which these
arbitration [provisions] and class action waivers are employed,” and it
characterized that deployment as “unfortunate, and in many situations,
unjust”325—claimants do not know they are waiving class actions, they
are not allowed to join together, and the individual recovery is not worth
the expense of separate arbitration. The court nevertheless compelled
nonaggregated employee arbitration because a judge “is not at liberty to
ignore the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.”326
D. CLAIM SUPPRESSION—PROCEDURE DETERMINING SUBSTANCE
Prior to AMEX/Concepcion, the effective vindication exception existed
as a narrow but essential safety valve. It prevented the FAA’s broad proarbitration policy from eviscerating claimants’ potentially meritorious, al319. See FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1) (facilitating easy joinder of claimants).
320. See Chaw, supra note 315.
321. Id.; Garcia & Caseria, supra note 221 (the AMEX majority made “class action
waivers ironclad”); Moe Cain, Supreme Court Allows Class-Action Waivers in Arbitration
Agreements, LEGAL FINANCING 4 U (July 17, 2013), http://cash.immigrationmaster.ca/
?p=36 [https://perma.cc/4WH7-CHJR] (predicting that the Court’s conservative majority
would continue “[t]o . . . hammer[ ] everything [that] looks like a nail” and that “every[ ]
[form of litigation that] looks like a class action[ would] be dismantled”).
322. No. 13-1674, 2013 WL 6498392, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2013).
323. Id. at *16; Jason M. Halper & William J. Foley, United States: Seven Months After
“American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant”: The End of Class Actions?, MONDAQ,
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/285906/Class+Actions/Seven+Months+After+Am
erican+Express+v+Italian+Colors+Restaurant+The+End+Of+Class+Actions [https://per
ma.cc/PPB9-6T7S] (last updated Jan. 14, 2014) (noting that some courts seek ways to navigate the AMEX and Concepcion rulings in order to preserve class procedures for arbitration and avoid unjust consequences); see also Damato v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 13CV-994, 2013 WL 3968765, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2013) (attempting to preserve the
essence of class action procedures for small claimants despite defendant Time Warner
Cable’s individual arbitration contract clause).
324. Porreca, 2013 WL 6498392, at *1, *16 (filing a class action suit challenging a “longstanding policy and practice of paying tipped employees less than the hourly minimum
wage yet requiring these tipped employees to spend a substantial amount of time performing an array of duties outside of the duties of their tipped positions for which there is no
possibility of earning tips” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
325. Id. at *16.
326. Id.

2017]

Critical Procedure

811

beit moderate-value, federal claims.327 Courts would not enforce an arbitration agreement that effectively, for practical reasons, foreclosed the
claimants from vindicating those claims.328
As discussed, the Scalia majority in AMEX practically entombed the
effective vindication exception.329 It protected business defendants by
suppressing a range of claims of modest individual value (albeit of substantial cumulative worth). After AMEX/Concepcion, in theory, as Justice
Scalia pointed out, claimants with modest-value claims can still arbitrate
individually. But, as Justice Kagan responded, in reality, in the face of
aggressive defendant litigation tactics, the cost of individually arbitrating
often forecloses claim assertion entirely.330
As critical procedure inquiry reveals, this efficiency-justified arbitral
regime is anything but substance neutral in effect. Professor Schwartz
aptly characterizes it as “claim-suppressing arbitration.”331 Arbitration
clauses crafted by large businesses diminish or even eliminate their substantive law liability.332 Professors Paul Carrington and Paul Haagen eloquently predict that now corporate defendants will become “birds of prey
[that] will sup on [small claimants like] workers, consumers, shippers, passengers, and [small businesses].”333
Richards v. Ernst & Young, LLP334 is illustrative. After years of costly
pretrial discovery,335 the Ninth Circuit compelled individual arbitration
of claims originally filed in court as a class action asserting wage and hour
violations by employer Ernst & Young.336 The Ninth Circuit enforced the
employment contracts’ mandatory individual arbitration clauses under
the FAA and, following AMEX, discounted proof that individual arbitration (without cost sharing) would be prohibitively expensive337—effec327. Brief for Respondents at 13, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct.
2304 (2013) (No. 12-133); Glover, supra note 214, at 3072 n.93 (determining that the effective vindication principle was crafted as a narrow but essential safety valve for ensuring
that the FAA’s broad policy in favor of arbitration does not eviscerate federal rights).
328. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
329. See supra Section V.B.
330. See Garcia & Caseria, supra note 221 (concluding that courts will be unable to help
small claimants escape an individual arbitration agreement even though arbitration is
clearly economically prohibitive).
331. David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J.
239, 243 (2012); see also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 944–45 (1999) (describing
arbitration history).
332. David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1247, 1253 (2009).
333. Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT.
REV. 331, 401 (1996).
334. 744 F.3d 1072, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013).
335. Richards v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. C-08-04988, 2012 WL 92738, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 11, 2012) (determining “that defendant [Ernst & Young] had waived its right to arbitration by litigating the actions for years without raising the . . . arbitration clause in the
plaintiff’s employment agreements”).
336. Richards, 744 F.3d at 1074 (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish any
prejudice resulting from Ernst & Young’s alleged delay in asserting its arbitral rights).
337. Id. at 1074–75; see Barnes, supra note 298, at 346; see generally Miller & Hunt,
supra note 189 (concluding that courts after AMEX will enforce arbitration clauses even
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tively preventing employees from pursuing their claims at all.338 The
bottom line substantive law impact: across the board claim
suppression.339
Critical procedure underscores the social costs of this kind of procedurally shrouded substantive claim suppression. Workers are deprived of a
viable forum for their moderate value (though personally significant)
wage claims. Moreover, compelled privatized, individualized arbitration
of wage violations impedes the articulation of public values and squelches
public awareness of possibly pervasive employer mistreatment of employees.340 This diminishes employer incentives to treat workers fairly and
comply with the law. Critical inquiry into who wins and who loses from
procedural changes thus highlights the AMEX/Concepcion majority’s
stark ideological preference for the economically dominant.
For these reasons, the several states’ Attorneys General pressed the
U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau for action. They determined
that “[m]andatory [private] arbitration . . . jeopardizes one of the fundamental rights of Americans; the right to be heard and seek judicial redress for our claims” and represents “a systemic failure to hold [publicly]
accountable those companies who abuse the trust placed in them by consumers.”341 Congress thereafter instructed the CFPB to study the impact
of mandatory individualized arbitration on consumers of financial products and services.342
though the costs of individually litigating the claims in arbitration outweigh potential
recovery).
338. Richards, 744 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d
691, 698 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A]ny extra expense incurred as a result of [an employee’s]
deliberate choice . . . in contravention of their contract, cannot be charged to [an employer].”); Barnes, supra note 298, at 346–47; cf. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d
975, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding an arbitration clause waiving class actions violates
NLRA because the “clause prevents concerted activity by employees in arbitration proceedings, and . . . prevents the initiation of concerted legal action anywhere else”).
339. Philip Bump, How the Supreme Court’s Decision on American Express and Class
Actions Could Affect You, BUS. INSIDER (June 20, 2013, 3:02 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/american-express-v-italian-colors-2013-6 [https://perma.cc/9WQA-LCY6].
340. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat, supra note 6, at 408 n.312. As integral to courts as
sites of cultural performances,
[m]inority perspectives are communicated through the legal process to the
public in at least three general ways. First, group members spread the message about the litigation and its issues to one another and to an expanding
circle of interested others through word of mouth, newsletters, meetings and
demonstrations. Second, if the litigation appears controversial and the message can be packaged attractively, the news media will present a minority’s
views. Finally, the court’s decision and opinion become recorded history. The
court’s articulation and treatment of minorities’ perspectives may have significant effect. It may recognize the legitimacy of those views or it may devalue
them. In either event the court is likely to reveal value judgments that will
serve as a basis for future discourse.
Id.
341. Letter from State Attorneys General to Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin.
Prot. Bureau 2–3 (Nov. 19, 2014) [https://perma.cc/P65M-UQNA].
342. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1028(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 2003–04 (2010) (authorizing the CFPB to study “the use of
agreements providing for arbitration of any future dispute between covered persons and

2017]

Critical Procedure

813

The CFPB study found stark claim-suppression consequences. PostAMEX/Concepcion mandatory “arbitration agreements are being widely
used to prevent consumers from seeking relief from legal violations on a
class basis, and . . . consumers rarely file individual lawsuits or arbitration
cases to obtain such relief.”343 The CFPB then promulgated an administrative rule to address the consumer claim suppression consequences of
AMEX/Concepcion. The CFPB rule sought to undo the effects AMEX
and Concepcion for consumer financial transactions. The rule
prohibits covered providers of certain consumer financial products
and services from using an agreement with a consumer that provides
for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties to bar the
consumer from filing or participating in a class action concerning the
covered consumer financial product or service.344
But, as anticipated, politics intervened345 and in late 2017, Congress and
the President blocked the CFPB’s rule.346
The National Labor Relations Board also attempted to intervene in
situations covered by the National Labor Relations Act. The Board refused to enforce class action waivers, ruling that mandatory individual
arbitration vitiates employees’ “right[s] to engage in concerted activit[y]”
protected by the federal labor organizing statute.347 But that limited ruling was upended by federal courts and is now likely to be invalidated by
the Supreme Court, with Justice Neil Gorsuch in Scalia’s stead.348

consumers in connection with the offering or providing of consumer financial products or
services”).
343. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33,210, 33210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1040).
344. Id.
345. See Evan Weinberger, Industry Gears Up to Battle CFPB Arbitration Rule, LAW360
(Aug. 19, 2016, 8:32 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/829906/industry-gears-up-to-battle-cfpb-arbitration-rule [https://perma.cc/DR3E-MZ89] (warning that the fate of CFPB’s
arbitration rule will ultimately be challenged by the affected industries and decided by a
conservative court); Seth Welborn, Is the Future of CFPB’s Arbitration Proposal in
Doubt?, MREPORT (Nov. 14, 2016), http://www.themreport.com/daily-dose/11-14-2016/future-cfpbs-arbitration-proposal-doubt [https://perma.cc/3GBG-EC43] (highlighting that
the substantial support for CFPB’s arbitration rule faces an uphill battle with the Trump
Administration and Republican congressional majorities).
346. In November 2017, President Trump signed congressional legislation blocking enforcement of the CFPB rule. H.R.J. Res. 111, 115th Cong., 131 Stat. 1243 (2017). See supra
note 24.
347. See In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2291–92 (2012) (determining that
compelled arbitration class waivers violate employees’ right to engage in concerted activity
under the NLRA §§ 8(a)(1) and (4)).
348. See Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted,
137 S. Ct. 809 (2017) (appealing U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals’ ruling enforcing arbitration class waivers under the National Labor Relations Act). After certiorari was
granted, Neil Gorsuch assumed former Justice Scalia’s Supreme Court seat.
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E. BUSINESS IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL LIABILITY AND PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY— “INSULATING WRONGDOERS
FROM LIABILITY”
As the underbelly to claim suppression, AMEX/Concepcion have enabled large businesses to avoid legal liability and public accountability.
Critical procedure captures the differential group impacts. For attorney
Lauren Guth Barnes, the conservative majority exhibited “not only unfairness to the harmed consumers but also a systemic failure to hold accountable [and liable] those companies who abuse the trust placed in
them by consumers.”349 Barnes characterizes these consequences of the
arbitration rulings as “near immunity for . . . corporate wrongdoers.”350
Justice Kagan, in AMEX, calls it “insulat[ing] wrongdoers from liability.”351 Without class actions, without a public forum, and without an effective vindication cost exception, businesses can violate the rights of
employees, consumers, or tenants without fear of legal reprisals. That de
facto corporate legal immunity is what some describe as “an alternate
legal system” for business. And it comes at the expense of public
accountability.352
Moreover, by avoiding “courts and the cultural performance,” AMEX/
Concepcion’s vastly expanded arbitral regime reposes control over substantive law to large businesses and removes it from public lawmakers
and judges.353 As Professor Glover observes, the AMEX majority
“placed the power to craft . . . plaintiffs’ path to [effective] vindication of
substantive rights . . . in the hands of private, [economically powerful]
would-be defendants” and “not in the hands of the public lawmaking
bodies.”354 The consequences: ideologically driven, court-generated immunity for businesses and starkly diminished corporate accountability—
both undermining rule of law’s legitimacy.
VII. CRITICAL CONCLUSIONS: THE IDEOLOGICAL
DEPLOYMENT OF PROCEDURE—
”DO NOT BE FOOLED”
In short, AMEX/Concepcion’s procedural rulings morphed mandatory
arbitration into a do-it-yourself claim suppression guide for large companies. More so, the conservative majority’s decisions substantially benefit
large businesses by keeping out of the public eye dirty legal laundry
349. Barnes, supra note 298, at 354 (quoting Letter, Attorneys General, supra note
341).
350. Id. at 330; see also Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke L.J. 1, 45 (2010) (discussing the
problem of informational asymmetry where large institutions possess essential litigation
information in their files and computers).
351. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
352. See Glover, supra note 214, at 3076 (predicting diminished corporate accountability to the public and to the rule of law).
353. Id. at 3074.
354. Id.
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sought to be aired by employees, consumers, tenants, small businesses,
and discrimination claimants.
Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and Breyer objected strenuously. American
Express and other similar businesses, they observed, would be insulated
from widespread liability, even when they clearly violated the law and
harmed many in identical ways. For the dissenting justices, after AMEX
and Concepcion, pursuit of small-to-modest-value claims against large
businesses or institutions is “a fool’s errand.”355 And without legal liability and public accountability, those businesses and institutions possess little incentive to stop profitably violating the law.
Critical procedure’s rejection of the myth of the inherent neutrality of
facially uniform procedures and its attention to context and consequences
help unearth AMEX/Concepcion’s ideological underpinnings. Critical
procedure sees the expanded arbitral regime as integral to the broad Second Wave’s constriction of court access and claim development—significantly disadvantaging the claims of those less powerful under the guise of
neutral efficiency reforms. Looking behind bland procedural language at
differential group impacts shows, for some, what ostensibly efficiencydriven arbitrator rulings are actually designed to be: “an alternate system
of justice”356 that strongly favors large companies and institutions while
treating “the weak and the aggrieved unfairly.”357
Critical procedure inquiries into empowerment/disempowerment, differential group impacts, the myth of inherent procedural neutrality, public values articulation, and consciousness-raising—all backstopped by
contextual interrogation of ideology—disrobe AMEX/Concepcion and
Justice Scalia’s efficiency rhetoric. Those ADR cases are not isolated rulings about more efficient dispute resolution. Instead, the regime of
mandatory privatized, individualized arbitration—dramatically expanded
by five justices—lodges squarely amid, and markedly advances, the conservative majority’s Second Wave of procedural constraints on courthouse entry and claim development. That regime is close kin to
heightened fact pleading, elevated barriers to class certification, diminished court personal jurisdictional reach over out-of-state manufacturers,
narrowed preliminary injunctive relief, and expanded defendant summary judgments.
In sum, critical procedure reveals the impact of the AMEX/Concepcion rulings and the conservative majority Justices’ “Second Wave” constriction of court access and claim development. In the words of Judge
Young, in the epigraph, “[o]minously, business has a good chance of opting out of the legal system altogether and misbehaving without reproach.”358 And Judge Weinstein aptly highlights what is at stake: This
“erection of barriers to court access under the guise of procedural effi355.
356.
357.
358.

Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Silver-Greenberg & Corkey, supra note 2.
Weinstein, supra note 1, at 1906.
Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 3 (quoting Judge William Young).
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ciency . . . undermine[s] the legitimacy of the legal system.”359 For in the
end, it is not only about procedure. It is about power and substantive
advantage for some over others. It is about injustice—or justice—for people and communities. “Do not be fooled.”360

359. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 1906.
360. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting).

